Business Cycles and Earnings Inequality

Byoungchan Lee*

The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

August 19, 2019

Abstract

Does inequality react to stabilization policies and macroeconomic shocks at business cycle frequencies? Does an unanticipated innovation in inequality impact aggregate demand and drive cyclical fluctuations? Does the level of inequality influence the propagation of stabilization policies? This paper answers these questions both empirically and theoretically. I construct a novel, high-quality, quarterly measure of earnings inequality and document the following facts. First, an expansionary productivity shock and a contractionary government expenditure shock reduce earnings inequality significantly at the medium-run, while monetary policy shocks have little effects. Second, an unanticipated positive innovation in earnings inequality, which summarizes redistribution from the poor to the rich, lowers aggregate demand substantially in a U-shaped manner. Lastly, the power of stabilization policies increases with the level of inequality. To rationalize these results, I develop a tractable, theoretical framework. I analytically illustrate that inequality in a simple two-agent model is related to demand shocks in a representative agent framework. To match the shape and magnitude of the empirical impulse responses, I further introduce new features including countercyclical earnings risk, an endogenous extensive margin of being credit constrained, and decreasing relative risk aversion preferences.

Keywords: business cycle, inequality, impulse response, forecast error variance decomposition, stabilization policy, marginal propensity to consume

JEL Codes: E32, E21, E52, E62, D31

---

*bclee@ust.hk. I am especially grateful to Yuriy Gorodnichenko for his continual support and invaluable guidance. Emmanuel Saez gave important advice on including, but not limited to, the construction of inequality measures. I also thank ChaeWon Baek, Saroj Bhattarai, Olivier Blanchard, Nicolas Caramp, Chris Edmond, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Matthias Hoelzlein, Rupal Kamdar, Amir Kermani, Woojin Kim, Dmitri Koustas, Young-hwan Lee, Emi Nakamura, Tommaso Porzio, Walker Ray, David Romer, Nick Sander, Benjamin Schoefer, Dmitriy Sergeyev, Ludwig Straub, Mauricio Ulate, Michael Weber, and seminar participants at Berkeley, City University of HK, HKUST, HKU, Yonsei, and the EGSC at Washington University in St. Louis for helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are my own.

[T]he various linkages between heterogeneity and aggregate demand are not yet well understood, either empirically or theoretically. – Yellen (2016)

1 Introduction

The Great Recession was a pivotal moment for modern business cycle research. One of the key elements revealed by the recession was that distributional factors could have significant effects on macroeconomic fluctuations. Indeed, a major objective of policymakers has since become understanding the interplay between inequality and business cycles and analyzing what distributional effects various macroeconomic stabilization policies have while achieving their intended aggregate goals. But this is not the only question that the Great Recession poses. Another important issue is whether inequality and redistribution contribute to variation in aggregate demand. If distributional forces can initiate demand-driven business cycles, appropriate policies should be taken to stabilize the economy. In this regard, it is central to understand how the power of stabilization policies varies with the level of inequality. Although the Great Recession spurred interest in these questions, research in this area is still in its infancy. We have limited understanding of the relationship between business cycles, inequality, and stabilization policies, either empirically or theoretically as underscored by former Fed chair Janet Yellen (2016).

This paper develops a new framework for studying the linkages between inequality and aggregate dynamics. The model highlights key mechanisms for the interaction between a cross-sectional distribution and aggregate demand while maintaining tractability. The theory is further connected to the novel empirical findings based on a high-quality quarterly measure of inequality that I construct. The structural interpretation of my results provides new insights on the interplay of inequality, business cycles, and stabilization policies.

I investigate the U.S. data where the recent rise in inequality has been most prominent. I empirically study how drivers of business cycles including shocks to total factor productivity, monetary policy, and fiscal policy cause variation in inequality at cyclical frequencies. I also explore the other direction from inequality to macroeconomic fluctuations. I document that changes in the shape of cross-sectional distributions in combination with heterogeneous marginal propensities to consume (MPC) across agents may influence aggregate demand. These results illustrate why inequality matters for both business cycles and policymakers, and vice versa.

To shed light on the mechanisms through which inequality impacts aggregate demand, I develop a new theoretical framework. My model captures how inequality, MPCs, and aggregate demand interact in a parsimonious manner. The empirical results are also successfully rationalized by the model with novel insights on how aggregate consumption demand is determined. An intriguing policy implication of the model is that the power of monetary and fiscal policies increases with the level of inequality, where the interaction between inequality and MPC plays a key role for the result. This provides yet another reason why inequality is relevant for stabilization policies and why policymakers should be aware of the distributional outcomes of their policies, even if their objectives are based only on aggregate economic conditions.

For the empirical analysis, the biggest hurdle is to find a high-frequency measure of inequality.[1] I resolve the problem by constructing a new quarterly inequality index based on the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), a quarterly, publicly available, administrative database featuring wide coverage. The QCEW publishes counts of employment and total pre-tax earnings at the U.S. county level by detailed industry classification codes. The earnings include bonuses, stock options, profit distributions, and some fringe benefits such as cash value of meals and lodging.

I extract an earnings distribution in each quarter from the microdata. Although the QCEW is not at the individual level, it is disaggregated enough to capture major dynamics of earnings inequality. Indeed, the number of observations is enormous given the administrative nature of the data source. Also, inequality series based on the QCEW show similar historical trends to existing ones based on individual but annual data. Lastly, it is important that my benchmark measure is the log P90/P10 index, which does not require measuring earnings within the tails. Instead, my focus is on the "middle class," who contribute to aggregate variables significantly.

I study how driving forces of business cycles influence earnings inequality using this new, high-quality, quarterly time series. I report impulse responses and forecast error variance decompositions to illustrate the relationships between earnings inequality and shocks to total factor productivity, monetary policy, and fiscal policy. I employ local projections of

[1] Most of the existing measures of inequality are annual such as the top income share of Piketty and Saez (2003), the top wealth share of Saez and Zucman (2016), the log P90/P10 wage ratio of Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008), and the Gini coefficient prepared by the U.S. Census Bureau. However, annual data are not fitting for the time series analysis in this paper due to small sample sizes and difficulties in identifying high-frequency variations.

Jordà (2005) to estimate the impulse response functions and find that an unanticipated expansion in government spending raises earnings inequality, while a positive productivity shock lowers it. However, the responses are small and statistically insignificant for the first two years for both shocks. On the other hand, shocks to monetary policy have little effects on earnings inequality. For the forecast error variance decompositions, I apply a new and flexible method with local projections developed by Gorodnichenko and Lee (2017). The results are consistent with the impulse responses in the sense that only technology and fiscal policy shocks contribute to earnings inequality significantly in the medium-run. Also, most of the short-run fluctuations in the new inequality measure are not explained by those shocks. These facts may provide useful empirical inputs to theoretical heterogeneous agent models (for example, Gornemann, Kuester and Nakajima, 2016; Guerrieri and Lorenzoni, 2017; Kaplan, Moll and Violante, 2018; McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson, 2016; McKay and Reis, 2016).

The next part of the paper investigates the opposite direction, from inequality to business cycles. Researchers have spent an enormous amount of time and effort to detect and evaluate sources of business cycles. While this literature typically focuses on level shocks on aggregates, I propose to use innovations in inequality as a measure of "redistribution" shocks. Rising inequality or redistribution from the poor to the rich may reduce aggregate demand and impact on aggregate variables because marginal propensities to consume (MPC) decrease in income or wealth (see Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes, 2004; Johnson, Parker and Souleles, 2006; Parker et al., 2013; Zidar, 2018).

Specifically, I rely on unanticipated innovations in the time series of earnings inequality, which are orthogonal to aggregate shocks and macroeconomic variables. These innovations summarize redistributive forces shifting earnings from the bottom to the top while maintaining aggregate earnings contemporaneously. I show that such redistribution that increases earnings inequality lowers aggregate demand substantially. Major macroeconomic variables such as real GDP, consumption, investment, price levels, and the federal funds rate decline in a U-shaped manner in response to the positive unanticipated innovations. Furthermore, the responses are large. For example, 35 percent of the forecast error variance of real GDP per capita at a four-year horizon is due to these innovations. In short, redistribution shocks seem to be an important driving force of regular business cycle dynamics similar to standard level shocks to aggregates.

To illustrate the mechanisms through which shocks to inequality affect an economy, I develop New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. I study two models, a simple one for the intuition based on analytical results and a medium-sized one for the quantitative analysis rationalizing the large, negative, U-shaped responses. The models feature two agents who are either hand-to-mouth or intertemporal in line with Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2007). Unlike usual two-agent models, I assume that the labor productivity of both agents differs, where the hand-to-mouth agent is less productive. This setup is in accordance with the data in the sense that MPCs decrease in income or wealth, that the probability of being credit constrained decreases in income (Crook, 2001, 2006), and that there is limited participation in financial markets among households below median wealth (Guiso and Sodini, 2013).

I consider a shock increasing the dispersion of the idiosyncratic labor productivity, which makes the rich richer and the poor poorer. The main analytical result based on the simple two-agent New Keynesian (TANK) model is that this earnings inequality shock is isomorphic to a discount rate shock in a textbook representative agent New Keynesian (RANK) model. This new finding illustrates in a simple way why individual heterogeneity associated with earnings inequality can be a micro-foundation for an aggregate demand shock in a RANK framework.

However, this simple TANK model cannot rationalize the empirical impulse responses, especially the U-shaped patterns. Thus, I extend the simple model and develop a two-agent medium-sized DSGE model with three novel features affecting aggregate demand: an endogenous extensive margin between two agents, decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA) consumption utility, and a small amount of financial income for the credit constrained agents. In a recession, there may be more consumers subject to credit constraints due to unemployment risk (Ravn and Sterk, 2017) or countercyclical idiosyncratic earnings risk conditional on being employed (Guvenen, Ozkan and Song, 2014; Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron, 2004). This leads to more consumers having higher MPCs during deeper recessions. Indeed, Mian, Rao and Sufi (2013) and Mian and Sufi (2015) document that limited access to credit and related MPC heterogeneity played a central role in the development of the Great Recession. I provide a parsimonious characterization of this channel in the model as well as a micro-foundation for it. Another new feature is that the degree of relative risk aversion (RRA) of both agents may differ. When the model is estimated, the coefficient of RRA of the hand-to-mouth agents is higher than that of the intertemporal agents. As agents move from the credit constrained state to the intertemporal state, their consumption increases and their coefficients of RRA decrease. This is exactly DRRA preferences because the same agent alternates between the two states in my model. Note that DRRA preferences also conform to empirical findings of Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2009, Section IV.C). Finally, I assume that the credit-constrained agents also receive non-zero (albeit small) financial income for three reasons. First, the wealthy hand-to-mouth agents of Kaplan and Violante (2014) and Kaplan, Violante and Weidner (2014) would hold a significant amount of assets and receive dividends while they are credit constrained. Second, some wealth poor agents engage in financial investment (Guiso and Sodini, 2013). Lastly, this may represents government transfers and pensions in a parsimonious way. My model further incorporates characteristics of medium-sized RANK models such as investment or capital utilization adjustment costs, sticky prices and wages, and habit preferences (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2007). Because a consumer is temporarily hand-to-mouth or temporarily intertemporal, I dub the model "the Temporarily Hand-to-mouth and Intertemporal agent New Keynesian model," or in short, "the THINK."

I estimate the model using a Bayesian impulse response matching method of Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2010). This approach enables me to focus on structural shocks with clearly identified empirical counterparts. The estimated model generates large and U-shaped impulse responses to the earnings inequality shocks, comparable to the empirical responses to the unanticipated innovations in inequality. In doing so, the model relies on the interplay of the three new features discussed above, which induces intriguing dynamics in discount factors and aggregate demand. For example, the number of credit constrained agents is time-varying because of the endogenous extensive margin of being credit constrained and countercyclical earnings risk. This adds a new component in aggregate consumption demand in the following way. When aggregate demand decreases in response to an inequality shock, the economy goes into a recession. Then some agents are hit by large negative idiosyncratic shocks due to countercyclical earnings risk and unemployment risk. As they become credit constrained and reduce consumption, aggregate consumption demand decreases and the economy falls into a deeper recession. Then more agents become credit constrained and so on. Such distributional effects are crucial for rationalizing the shape and magnitude of the empirical responses of aggregate consumption to the unanticipated innovations in inequality.

Another important prediction of my theory is that inequality affects the power of stabilization policies. Intuitively, in an economy with high inequality, there may be more people at the bottom of either income or wealth distribution. Also, these people have higher MPCs because they do not have enough buffers to absorb shocks. An interaction effect between more people and higher MPCs makes aggregate consumption demand more sensitive to economic conditions including monetary and fiscal policies. This channel is relevant to the U.S. economy because the share of households with negative net wealth has been increasing since 1969 (Wolff, 2017). Consistent with these insights, the non-linear dynamics of the THINK model predicts that the economy responds more strongly to a monetary or government spending shock when there are more credit constrained agents. If the interaction effect also applies to other structural shocks, the aggregate economy may fluctuate more, and so cyclical volatility in general may be elevated. But on the bright side, stabilization policies become more powerful too.

Given the policy implication based on the model, I empirically test whether aggregate variables react differently to policy shocks conditional on the level of inequality. Using a variety of datasets (state-level, aggregate, various identified shock series, and sample periods), I find that the U.S. economy responds more strongly to either a monetary or fiscal policy shock of the same magnitude when income is distributed more unequally.

There are several empirical studies on cyclical variations of inequality. Some focus on the effects of inflation on poverty or redistribution of nominal wealth (Blank and Blinder, 1986; Doepke and Schneider, 2006; Romer and Romer, 1999). Others look at differential exposure of individual consumption, earnings, and income to aggregate fluctuations (Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2009; Guvenen, Ozkan and Song, 2014; Guvenen et al., 2017). Coibion et al. (2017) deals with the dynamics of inequality conditional on monetary policy shocks, which is the most related previous work to this paper. However, this paper differs from Coibion et al. in several respects. First, I study how inequality impacts business cycles as well as whether major structural shocks affect inequality, whereas Coibion et al. concentrates solely on the effects of monetary policy shocks on inequality. Second, I articulate mechanisms at play using structural models, while the analysis of Coibion et al. is purely empirical. Lastly, data sources are different. Coibion et al. constructs measures of inequality based on the Consumer Expenditure Survey, while I use the QCEW.

My model features both hand-to-mouth and intertemporal agents. Such models have been used to study monetary policy rules (Bilbiie, 2008; Galí, López-Salido and Vallés, 2004) and effects of government spending shocks (Bilbiie, Meier and Müller, 2008; Galí, López-Salido and Vallés, 2007) when there are hand-to-mouth consumers following Campbell and Mankiw (1989). While these models usually assume equally productive agents and ignore distributional factors, I introduce earnings inequality with heterogeneous labor productivity. This provides a new, simple theoretical framework for studying inequality and macroeconomic fluctuations. Furthermore, this parsimonious framework is consistent with the empirical evidence that less productive workers have higher MPCs and are more likely to be credit constrained (see Crook, 2001, 2006; Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes, 2004; Johnson, Parker and Souleles, 2006; Parker et al., 2013; Zidar, 2018).

There have been papers summarizing individual heterogeneity by a wedge to a discount factor in an aggregate consumption Euler equation (Braun and Nakajima, 2012; Constantinides and Duffie, 1996; Werning, 2015). These papers show exact aggregation is possible under some restrictive assumptions. I derive a similar result for a canonical TANK model in a first-order approximation and connect earnings inequality to aggregate demand and discount rate shocks more explicitly.

Another framework for studying economic fluctuations with distributional issues is based on heterogeneous agent New Keynesian (HANK) models. These quantitative models generate a realistic description of cross-sectional distributions of households as an equilibrium outcome (see Kaplan and Violante, 2018, for a review). Others propose models with two (or a finite number of) agents as a middle ground between tractable RANK and rich HANK models and provide analytical expressions highlighting HANK mechanisms (Acharya and Dogra, 2018; Bilbiie, 2017; Debortoli and Galí, 2017; Ragot, 2018; Ravn and Sterk, 2018). I take a similar approach to emphasize insights based on analytical results while utilizing efficient tools developed for solving and estimating medium-sized models.

The THINK model features an extensive margin between two agents. Bilbiie (2017) considers an analogous channel with fixed transition probabilities in his analytically tractable HANK model and illustrates how it relates to the discounted Euler equation of McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson (2017). Because the transition probabilities are fixed, the number of credit constrained agents in his model is constant. My paper goes one step further and makes transition probabilities vary endogenously with aggregate fluctuations. Because earnings risk is countercyclical as reported by Guvenen, Ozkan and Song (2014), Ravn and Sterk (2017), and Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004), it is harder for credit constrained agents to escape from their constraints during a recessions. This would increase the number of credit constrained agents during economic downturns, constituting a new channel for aggregate consumption dynamics.

Auclert and Rognlie (2018) also investigate the effects of redistribution shocks on economic output in their HANK model. However, the THINK model differs from the model of Auclert and Rognlie in several respects. First, Auclert and Rognlie work with a continuum of heterogeneous agents, whereas the THINK model is based on two agents. Second, Auclert and Rognlie assume a constant RRA (CRRA) utility function, while I assume a DRRA preference with habit formation. For the supply block, Auclert and Rognlie let downward nominal wage rigidities induce room for monetary policies, whereas I introduce both price and wage stickiness a la Rotemberg (1982). Lastly, my model includes an autoregressive term in monetary policy rule which does not exist in the model of Auclert and Rognlie. When all the differences are combined, the models generate divergent predictions on the effects of earnings inequality shocks. Auclert and Rognlie find that such shocks have little aggregate effects in their model, which is contrary to the predictions of the THINK model and my empirical results.

While previous research (*e.g.*, Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Bordo and Meissner, 2012; Cairó and Sim, 2017; Kumhof, Rancière and Winant, 2015) covers why a financial or political crisis may be related to inequality, little work has been done about the power of stabilization policies and volatility of regular business cycles given various degrees of inequality. Debortoli and Galí (2017) is a notable exception. Debortoli and Galí compare TANK models with the fixed but different steady state shares of the hand-to-mouth agents and find that the effects of monetary policy shocks are significantly larger around the steady state with more hand-to-mouth agents. In the THINK model, I focus on a non-linear interaction effect between more people and higher MPCs around the same steady state. I study fiscal policy shocks as well as monetary policy shocks, and I also find empirical results consistent with the theoretical predictions of my THINK model.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the construction of the new, high-quality, high-frequency measure of earnings inequality. Section 3 deals with the responses of earnings inequality to shocks to stabilization policies and total factor productivity. In Section 4, I study the direction from earnings inequality to key aggregate variables and illustrate that an unanticipated positive innovation in inequality decreases aggregate demand substantially in a U-shaped manner. Section 5 analyzes the mechanisms through which an inequality shock reduces aggregate demand and generates large, negative, U-shaped responses in DSGE models. Section 6 discusses the relationship between the power of stabilization policies and the level of inequality. Section 7 concludes.

2 A New Quarterly Measure of Inequality

2.1 Data

The Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) is a quarterly, publicly available, administrative database. The Bureau of Labor Statistics and the State Employment Security Agencies prepare the data based on reports filed by employers, collected for the unemployment insurance programs.

The employment series includes all forms of jobs: full-time, part-time, temporary, and permanent. The wages in the data are pre-tax earnings including bonuses, stock options, profit distributions, and some fringe benefits such as cash value of meals and lodging.

The main advantages of the QCEW are frequency, coverage, and accuracy. First, the QCEW is quarterly, whereas most of the other data previously used for studying inequality are annual.[2] Moreover, the QCEW covers all counties and industries. Finally, the data are administrative and therefore observed with little measurement error.

However, the data are not perfect. First, the data are not at the individual-level. The most granular information available is average earnings and the number of workers in a cell, where a cell is an industry/county/ownership-type combination.[3] Thus, measures in this paper represent between-cell, not within-cell inequality. Moreover, self-employed workers are not included, and some observations are suppressed due to confidentiality. Finally, the data cover only earnings.[4]

Despite these limitations, I will show in Section 2.2 that the log P90/P10 index based on the QCEW is consistent with the same measure based on the March annual demographic survey in the Current Population Survey (CPS), which is annual and individual-level (Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2008). In other words, the QCEW is sufficiently disaggregated, and so

[2]For example, Guvenen et al. (2015), Guvenen, Ozkan and Song (2014), and Song et al. (2018) use the Master Earnings File of the U.S. Social Security Administration. Piketty and Saez (2003) rely on tax returns statistics of the Internal Revenue Service. The Current Population Survey (CPS) is analyzed by Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008). The CPS has two types of earnings data. The first one is collected annually in the March annual demographic survey. The other is based on merged outgoing rotation groups (MORG) available monthly. However, the MORG data are about *usual* weekly earnings, and therefore it is not suitable for identifying high-frequency variation in inequality.

[3]The ownership code differentiates establishments owned privately, by a local government, by a state government, by the federal government, and by an international government.

[4]However, taking capital income into accounts might not affect the log P90/P10 index (the benchmark measure in this paper) significantly, because capital income is extremely concentrated above the top 10th percentile.

the measurement errors due to the unobservable within-cell inequality seem to be small.

I use several filters to attenuate the potential adverse effects of extreme observations and seasonality. First, observations with unreasonably small earnings are dropped. Following Guvenen et al. (2015), the threshold is what can be earned by working one-quarter of full-time at half of the legal minimum wage rate. Second, I seasonally adjust the percentiles of the log earnings distribution. These are available at three different levels of aggregation depending on period: SIC 2-digit for 1975:Q1-2000:Q4, SIC 4-digit for 1984:Q1-2000:Q4, and NAICS 6-digit for 1990:Q1-2014:Q4, where SIC and NAICS stand for the Standard Industrial Classification codes and the North American Industry Classification System, respectively. I splice these three series and deflate the combined one using the GDP implicit deflator (see Appendix A.1 for details).[5]

Table 1 shows summary statistics for selected quarters. The top half of Table 1 displays the number of observations and coverage. The number of cells is greater than two hundred thousand after a few early quarters, which far exceeds the number of respondents in a typical survey. The bottom half of the table shows the sizes of the cells. For example, there are around 66 workers in a median-sized cell, and this corresponds to only 0.00007% of the total number of workers in the first quarter of 2014. In other words, the sizes of most of the cells, in which I assume workers earn uniformly divided compensations, are small when we consider the cross-section of earnings.

2.2 Percentiles and Inequality Index

In the right panel of Figure 1, I plot the log of selected percentiles of the real earnings distributions. Median real earnings have not grown as fast as the upper half of the distribution for the last few decades, and therefore the U.S. real earnings distribution has widened. Similarly, the gap between the median and the bottom 10th percentile increased throughout most of the periods (Figure A2 in Appendix A). The late 1990s was an exception during which the gap was stable. Furthermore, the imprints of historical events such as the dot-com bubble around 2000 and the sub-prime crisis around 2008 are evident among the top percentiles.

The log P90/P10 index is on the left panel. When it is compared with an existing, annual measure reported by Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008), not only the historical pattern but also

[5]All standard macroeconomic variables are obtained from the FRED run by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

the values are similar.[6] Because Autor, Katz and Kearney use the CPS which is individual-level data, this similarity indicates that my quarterly log P90/P10 index is of high-quality.

The new quarterly log P90/P10 index, which is my benchmark inequality measure, has desirable properties for the following reasons. First, the QCEW is a large administrative dataset. Second, although within-cell inequality is not observable, the size of most cells is small. Furthermore, the P90/P10 index is rather robust to changes in within-cell inequality because the index utilizes only two points in the entire distribution.[7] Finally, considering the log P90/P10 index allows us to circumvent measuring inequality within the extreme tails and to focus on inequality in the "middle class," who affect aggregate variables significantly.

3 From Aggregate Shocks to Earnings Inequality

This section investigates how earnings inequality reacts to major drivers of business cycles, using the new, high-quality, quarterly measure of earnings inequality that I construct. The estimated impulse response functions and the forecast error variance decompositions constitute novel empirical facts regarding dynamics of earnings inequality.

3.1 Shocks and Sample Period

I analyze three structural shocks in relation to the inequality index. The identified shock series I employ are shocks to total factor productivity (TFP), monetary policy (MP), and fiscal policy (FP). Fernald (2014) provides a quarterly, utilization-adjusted series of the TFP. He deals with both capital and labor utilization, where the adjustment process is similar to how Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006) purify annual measures. For a monetary policy shock, Romer and Romer (2004) identify the MP shock as an orthogonal component in the federal funds rate to the Federal Reserves' information set around the Federal Open Market Committee meetings. I use an updated version of the shocks from Coibion et al. (2017), who extend the series to 2008. Finally, I rely on the FP shock series in Auerbach and

[6] I construct three other measures: (i) cross-sectional standard deviation of the log real earnings, (ii) Gini coefficients of the real earnings, and (iii) top 10% earnings share. Although these series replicate historical patterns successfully, the levels of them are lower than the corresponding measures based on individual-level data (Figure A3 and A4 in Appendix A).

[7] Relatedly, Song et al. (2018) argue that changes in earnings inequality in the U.S. have been primarily a between-firm phenomenon, not within-firm. This might explain why ignoring within-cell inequality leads to little distortions in time series variation.

Gorodnichenko (2012), which is constructed from comparison of the realized and forecasted growth rates of government spending. They use the forecasts from the Greenbook and the Survey of Professional Forecasts.

I select the first quarter of 1978 as the first period in the benchmark sample, when there was a significant change to coverage of the QCEW.[8] The last period of the sample is the fourth quarter of 2008, when the updated MP shock series ends.

3.2 Impulse Responses

Let y_t, $x_{t,1}$, $x_{t,2}$, and $x_{t,3}$ be the inequality index, TFP, MP, and FP shocks in period t, respectively. The response of y_{t+h} to a unit impulse in $x_{t,j}$ is denoted by $\psi_{h,j}$:

$$\psi_{h,j} = \frac{\partial y_{t+h}}{\partial x_{t,j}} \qquad \text{for all } h \text{ and } j. \tag{1}$$

The impulse response coefficients $\{\psi_{h,j}\}$ are estimated by local projections of Jordà (2005):

$$y_{t+h} - y_{t-1} = c_h + \sum_{i=1}^{L_y} \rho_i^{(h)} \Delta y_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{L_x} \sum_{j=1}^{3} \beta_{i,j}^{(h)} x_{t-i,j} + u_{t,h}^{(y)}, \tag{2}$$

where $\beta_{0,j}^{(h)}$ captures $\psi_{h,j}$ for each h and j. In other words, $\{\beta_{0,j}^{(h)} : \ h = 0, 1, \dots\}$ represents how the inequality index responds to $x_{t,j}$.

In Equation (2), lags of Δy_t are included on the right-hand side to absorb the predictable variation. I set L_y and L_x at six, but the results are robust to the lag length and various other specifications. Lastly, the identified shocks in Equation (2) are orthogonal. For every pair of the three shocks, the null of zero correlation is not rejected at the 5% level. Details of these statistical tests and sensitiveness analysis are in Appendix B.1-B.4.

I similarly estimate how the aggregate earnings in the QCEW react to the shocks and depict the results with that of the inequality index in Figure 2. Given a one standard deviation positive TFP shock (3 percent, annualized), the aggregate earnings increase with a peak of around 3 percent (annualized) after 10 quarters, but the inequality index decreases by around 2.5 log points (annualized) after 3 to 4 years. Thus, the earnings distribution shifts to the right, while the dispersion among the middle workers shrinks.

[8]Specifically, the Federal Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976 became effective on January 1, 1978. This incorporates major changes to state unemployment insurance program on which raw data of the QCEW are based on. See https://www.bls.gov/cew/cewbultncur.htm#Coverage.

This finding may sound contradictory to a view that rising earnings inequality in recent decades is due to skill-biased technological progress (Goldin and Katz, 2009; Krusell et al., 2000). However, the results in Figure 2 are about cyclical relationships between productivity and inequality around trends, not about the trends themselves. Furthermore, a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of Gornemann, Kuester and Nakajima (2016) similarly predicts that earnings inequality decreases when a positive productivity shock hits an economy.

Reduction in the inequality index is mostly because of compression among the upper half of the distribution, not the lower half. The log P90/P50 index decreases statistically significantly at the 10% level while the P50/P10 index does not as illustrated in Figure 3. However, the right-tail above P90 reacts differently. Indeed, the P99/P50 index increases by 5 log points (annualized) at the peak in response to a one standard deviation positive TFP shock.[9] The top 10% share also rises, contrary to the log P90/P10 index (see Figure B7).

In short, the earnings distribution becomes more right-skewed in response to a positive TFP shock. While the middle 80% shrinks, (especially the upper part), the right-tail diverges.

A contractionary MP shock decreases the aggregate earnings while it has little effects on the earnings dispersion among the employed. Coibion et al. (2017) also reports similar results based on a different dataset, especially in their Figure 3. Thus, any redistribution channel of monetary policy should be from either unemployment risk or financial income, not from labor earnings conditional on being employed (see Auclert, 2017; Kaplan, Moll and Violante, 2018, for the redistribution channel). In theory, earnings inequality may respond in either direction to a monetary policy shock. For example, earnings inequality increases given a contractionary monetary policy shock in the model of Gornemann, Kuester and Nakajima (2016). On the other hand, Dolado, Motyovszki and Pappa (2018) illustrate how earnings inequality between high and low-skilled workers could decline in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock in a NK model with search and matching frictions and capital-skill complementarity. However, neither of those theoretical predictions is consistent with my empirical result that the MP shock has little effects on the earnings inequality index.

The earnings distribution widens when government expenditures expand. The responses in Figure 2 are delayed and persistent like those for the TFP shocks. The peak effects are 3.8

[9] See figures in Appendix B.5 for how various percentiles respond to the shocks. This specific observation regarding P99 is in Figure B13.

log points (annualized) after 15 quarters given a one standard deviation shock (4.2 percent, annualized). Similarly, rising dispersion among the upper half is a key to the reaction because the P90/P50 index increases statistically significantly, while the P50/P10 index does not in Figure 3. Qualitatively, this result is consistent with the prediction of the model in Heer and Scharrer (2016). Heer and Scharrer find that an expansionary government spending shock raises income inequality in an overlapping generations model with both hand-to-mouth and intertemporal agents.

3.3 Forecast Error Variance Decompositions

Next, I evaluate the economic significance of each shock as a driver of earnings inequality at business cycle frequencies. I decompose the forecast error variance of the inequality index in relation to each shock. The parameters of interests are

$$s_{h,j} = \frac{Var\left(\sum_{i=0}^{h} \psi_{i,j} x_{t+h-i,j}\right)}{Var\left(y_{t+h} - y_{t-1} - P_{t-1}\left(y_{t+h} - y_{t-1}\right)\right)}, \tag{3}$$

where the subscript j indexes the type of shocks (TFP, MP, or FP), and P_t means a projection on a period t information set. The forecast error $y_{t+h} - y_{t-1} - P_{t-1}(y_{t+h} - y_{t-1})$ consists of the effects of $\{x_{t,j}\}$ and an unrelated component: $y_{t+h} - y_{t-1} - P_{t-1}(y_{t+h} - y_{t-1}) = \psi_{0,j} x_{t+h,j} + \cdots + \psi_{h,j} x_{t,j} + u^{(FE)}_{t,h,j}$. Then the contribution of the shock j's to the total variance of the forecast error is captured by $s_{h,j}$. In other words, it measures the importance of the shock j in explaining the dynamics of y_t at a horizon h.

I employ a bias-corrected R^2 estimator of Gorodnichenko and Lee (2017) who develop flexible methods for estimating the forecast error variance decompositions (FEVDs) with local projections. For the projection $P_{t-1}(\cdot)$ in Equation (3), I use the three shocks and Δy_t at lags 1 to 4.

Unlike other empirical results in this paper, the FEVDs for the FP shock are sensitive to the periods when the Fed targeted the quantity of non-borrowed reserves between 1979 and 1982.[10] Therefore, I plot the results in Figure 4 based on the sample both with and without the early Volcker period, where the latter sample spans from 1983:Q1 to 2008:Q4. Except for the sensitivity to the early Volcker period, the results are robust to other modifications

[10]Relatedly, Coibion (2012) and Romer and Romer (2004) find that the estimated effects of the MP shock on output is sensitive to several observations in this period.

in specification (Appendix B.6).

The TFP shock is a major determinant of earnings inequality at a 4-year horizon, explaining about 20-30 percent of the forecast error variances of the inequality index. The FP shock is another important factor. About 20 percent of the forecast error variances of the inequality index at the three to four-year horizons is due to the FP shock after the early Volcker period. Note that the results for the TFP and FP shocks are consistent with the delayed and persistent impulse response functions in Figure 2. For the MP shock, the estimated FEVDs are statistically insignificant, similar to the impulse responses in Figure 2.

In sum, expansionary fiscal policy shocks raise earnings inequality substantially at the medium-run. On the other hand, earnings inequality does not react to monetary policy shocks, which is contrary to the predictions of some theoretical heterogeneous agent models. This further implies that monetary actions are more suitable when policymaker's objective is to design earnings distribution-neutral stabilization policies. Finally, total factor productivity shocks also have the statistically and economically significant medium-run effects on earnings inequality.

Although macroeconomic factors contribute to cyclical variations in inequality significantly, they have little effects on the short-run dynamics. I will show in Section 4 that a considerable fraction of the short-run movements is similarly unpredictable when the information set is substantially extended. The next section investigates a role of this unanticipated variation in the inequality measure as a potential source of business cycles.

4 From Earnings Inequality to Business Cycles

The previous section highlights that drivers of business cycles, (especially shocks to TFP and fiscal policy), affect earnings inequality. Now I focus on the other direction, from earnings inequality to business cycles. I show that inequality itself impacts aggregate demand substantially by redistributing economic resources across agents with different MPCs, and so policies are called for to stabilize business cycles.

This section begins with heuristics of how shocks to earnings inequality can be related to aggregate demand shocks. For empirical analyses, I rely on unanticipated innovations in the inequality index, which summarize shocks to individual heterogeneity and redistributive factors in the economy in a parsimonious manner. In response to an unanticipated innovation in inequality that represents redistribution of earnings from the bottom to the top, aggregate variables such as real GDP, price level, and interest rates decline substantially in a U-shaped manner. The signs of the estimated impulse responses imply that redistribution shocks reduce aggregate demand. The forecast error variance decompositions further highlight that these redistributive forces may be an important source of macroeconomic fluctuations.

4.1 Inequality, Redistribution, and Aggregate Demand

How can redistribution shocks generate aggregate fluctuations? Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970, 1971) show that a mean-preserving spread can reduce aggregate consumption demand given a concave consumption function despite aggregate earnings remaining the same. Empirical evidence strongly supports the concavity of a consumption function (see Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes, 2004; Johnson, Parker and Souleles, 2006; Parker et al., 2013; Zidar, 2018). Therefore, an inequality shock constitutes a negative demand shock in a system of aggregate variables. Note that two factors are essential for this heuristics. First, the inequality shock reflects redistribution from the bottom to the top. Second, marginal propensity to consume decreases in income.

4.2 Unanticipated Innovations in Inequality

To empirically evaluate the mechanism above, I begin with identifying redistribution shocks from time-series variation. Specifically, I use an unanticipated innovation $x_{t,ineq}$ in the inequality index y_t:

$$y_t - y_{t-1} = \Gamma_x' \mathbf{Z}_t^{(x)} + x_{t,ineq}. \tag{4}$$

The unanticipated innovation in earnings inequality, or in short, inequality shock, is a component of y_t orthogonal to the information set denoted by $\mathbf{Z}_t^{(x)}$, which includes key macroeconomic variables such as effective federal funds rate (EFFR), inflation, and growth rate of real GDP, consumption, and investment, and the structural shocks in Section 3: the TFP, MP, and FP shocks. Throughout this paper, real GDP, consumption, and investment are measured in per capita terms. $\mathbf{Z}_t^{(x)}$ also contains an intercept and 6 lags of Δy_t and the variables above. I include a sufficient number of lags to remove predictable variation as much as possible.

Note that $\mathbf{Z}_t^{(x)}$ has contemporaneous values of the variables except for Δy_t. Thus, the identification of $x_{t,ineq}$ is equivalent to that of a structural vector autoregression model with Cholesky ordering where Δy_t is the last variable. By purging all contemporaneous co-movements, I define $x_{t,ineq}$ in a conservative manner.

An omitted variable bias might be a potential threat to my identification. If there is a demand shock not originating from, but affecting, earnings inequality, this may distort my empirical results. In this regard, I consider three probable confounding factors: shocks to an excess bond premium (EBP), news, and consumer confidence. For the EBP, I add a series built by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) to $\mathbf{Z}_t^{(x)}$, which is an average corporate bond premiums unrelated to the systematic default risk of individual firms. Identification of a news shock is based on stock prices $\ln S_t$ and TFP_t, similar to Beaudry and Portier (2006). The idea is that a component of the stock price unrelated to current productivity reflects news about the future. Lastly, I employ a measure of Barsky and Sims (2012) on consumer confidence, E5Y. Barsky and Sims show that the E5Y contains information on animal spirits in the sense of Lorenzoni (2009).

Although an uncertainty shock may be another confounding factor, it is unlikely to quantitatively affect my estimates. The identified $x_{t,ineq}$ based on the $\mathbf{Z}_t^{(x)}$ above is orthogonal to the uncertainty shock of Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015). Furthermore, the shocks do not Granger-cause each other (see Appendix C.1).

Figure 5 depicts the identified inequality shocks. It follows a white noise process in the sense that the autocorrelations and the partial-autocorrelations at every lag are statistically insignificant. The inequality shock does not Granger-cause the TFP, MP, FP, and uncertainty shocks, and vice versa. Lastly, either including a dummy variable for the early Volcker period in $\mathbf{Z}_t^{(x)}$ or using a sample from 1983:Q1 delivers effectively identical shock series (see Appendix C.1).

While it is not easy to rationalize the realized shocks, some of them have narratives related to distribution of tax changes. The identified series is consistent with leading tax reforms where the shades in Figure 5 denote when they are signed into law. For example, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, or Reagan II in Figure 5, reduced the top marginal income tax rates from 50% to 28%. Piketty and Saez (2003) note that the earnings distribution widened as a result at least temporarily. It was signed into law in the middle of the fourth quarter of 1986, and $x_{t,ineq}$ was positive in the following quarters. In a similar vein, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, or Reagan I, lowered the top tax rates from 70% to 50%, and the positive unanticipated innovations followed. Another example is the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 during the Clinton administration. It raised the top income tax rates from 31% to 39.6% and the negative $x_{t,ineq}$'s in 1993:Q4 and the following quarter may be related to the reform. Lastly, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, or the Bush tax cut lowered the top rates from 38.6% to 35%. The positive unanticipated innovations in the third and fourth quarters of 2003 might reflect this change.

4.3 Impulse Responses

In the beginning of this section, I raised the hypothesis that more inequality may reduce aggregate demand by redistributing resources from the bottom to the top. Here I empirically evaluate the hypothesis by looking at how key macroeconomic variables respond to the unanticipated innovations in inequality. My results are consistent with the hypothesis in the sense that real GDP, price level, and interest rates decline at the same time in response to $x_{t,ineq}$.

I employ the following local projections to estimate the impulse response functions:

$$m_{t+h} - m_{t-1} = \psi_h^{(m)} x_{t,ineq} + \Gamma_m' \mathbf{Z}_t^{(m)} + u_{t,h}^{(m)}, \tag{5}$$

where $\psi_h^{(m)}$ is the parameter of interest, and $\{\psi_h^{(m)} : h = 0, 1, \ldots\}$ represents how m_{t+h} responds to a unit shock in inequality. $\mathbf{Z}_t^{(m)}$ includes macroeconomic variables such as effective federal funds rate, inflation based on GDP deflator, and growth rates of real GDP, consumption, and investment, their lags, lags of $x_{t,ineq}$, and an intercept. Lag length is 6 and the results are robust to the lag specification. When estimating the responses of the inequality index y_t itself in response to the shock $x_{t,ineq}$, lags of Δy_t are further added to $\mathbf{Z}_t^{(m)}$.

The results in Figure 6 are consistent with the hypothesis that redistribution shocks reduce aggregate demand. A one standard deviation unanticipated innovation in earnings inequality lowers real GDP by 1.64 percent (annualized) after two years.[11] Similarly, real consumption, investment, and the EFFR decrease. While negative responses of the GDP deflator after 3 to 4 years are weak, this depends on the inclusion of the early Volcker period in the sample. When I exclude those periods from the sample, the estimated peak effect becomes -0.84 percent (annualized) and statistically significant (see Figure C5). The comovement that real GDP, consumption, investment, price level, and the policy rate decrease

[11] Although $x_{t,ineq}$ is a generated regressor, we do not need to adjust the inference when the null hypothesis is of no effect. See Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012, Appendix D) and Pagan (1984).

at the same time is in line with redistribution shocks being negative demand shocks. Note further that these variables react in a U-shaped manner, where the peak level of the responses is reached after about 2 years.

The responses are not only statistically significant, but also economically significant. The magnitudes of the responses are comparable to other prominent structural shocks. For example, a one standard deviation contractionary monetary policy shock of Romer and Romer (2004) reduces real GDP by about 2 percent (annualized) at the peak when estimated similarly (Figure D2). The TFP shock of Fernald (2014) also has a similar peak effect on real GDP (Figure D3). In short, inequality matters for aggregate fluctuations. More inequality increases the amount of slack in an economy by reducing aggregate demand substantially, and the results are robust to various modifications to the baseline specification including different lag length, exclusion of the early Volcker period, and using inequality measures other than the log P90/P10 index (see Appendix C.2).

Straub (2018) notes that aggregate implications of inequality may depend on whether it is based on permanent income or transitory income. Because consumption may be approximately linear in permanent income, rising permanent income inequality may have little imprints on aggregate demand. In this regard, it is intriguing that my unanticipated innovations raise the inequality index only temporarily in Figure 6. A one standard deviation innovation in inequality increases the log P90/P10 index approximately by 2 log points (annualized) concurrently, and the responses gradually return to zero similar to an AR(1) process. Thus, my series presumably represents shocks to transitory earnings.

4.4 Forecast Error Variance Decompositions

This subsection examines the economic importance of the redistribution shocks as a source of the U.S. business cycles. Specifically, I estimate how much forecast error variances of aggregate variables are attributable to the unanticipated innovations in earnings inequality.

I use a bias-corrected R^2 estimator of Gorodnichenko and Lee (2017) as in Section 3.3. The estimates for real GDP at a four-year horizon is 35 percent with the lower bound of its 90 percent confidence band being around 20 percent as depicted in Figure 7. The results are similar for real consumption and investment, (25 percent and 20 percent at a four-year horizon, respectively), implying that redistributive forces may be an important driver of aggregate fluctuations. The unanticipated innovations explain large variation of the log P90/P10 index in the short-run, consistent with the impulse responses in Figure 6. This further resembles the result in Section 3.3 that a significant fraction of the short-run variation in the log P90/P10 index is not predictable by shocks to the TFP, MP, and FP. On the other hand, the EFFR and GDP deflator are mostly driven by other factors. The results are not sensitive to the specification details (see Appendix C.3).[12]

Given the results so far, the main conclusion in Section 4 is that the redistribution shocks can reduce aggregate demand substantially in a U-shaped manner. This novel empirical finding leads to natural follow-up questions on mechanisms. The next section develops DSGE models to investigate the amplification and propagation mechanisms of shocks to inequality and illustrate how the shape and magnitude of the empirical impulse responses can be rationalized.

5 Inequality Shocks in DSGE Models

This section introduces inequality shocks into DSGE models. I show that an inequality shock in a simple two-agent New Keynesian (TANK) model is isomorphic to a discount rate shock in a textbook representative agent New Keynesian (RANK) model. This implies that earnings inequality can be a primitive source of an aggregate demand shock in a representative agent framework. For the quantitative evaluation, I develop the temporarily hand-to-mouth and intertemporal agent New Keynesian (THINK) model. I demonstrate how the model can replicate the large, negative, U-shaped, empirical impulse responses in Section 4.

5.1 Inequality Shocks in a Simple Two-Agent New Keynesian Model

Suppose that there are two types of households. The first type is a hand-to-mouth agent while the other type can smooth their consumption intertemporally. Following Debortoli and Galí (2017), I call the hand-to-mouth agents Keynesians and the others Ricardians.

The Keynesians are credit constrained and cannot engage in intertemporal optimization.

[12]Because it is not easy to estimate FEVDs precisely based on a finite sample, caution needs to be exercised when interpreting the results. In particular, the inequality shock might encompass measurement errors because it is a generated variable. However, Gorodnichenko and Lee (2017) show that measurement errors incur only negative asymptotic biases, and therefore my estimates are conservative in favor of no effect.

Thus, their consumption is determined by labor earnings:

$$P_t C_t^K = Z_t^K W_t N_t^K, \tag{6}$$

where $P_t = \left(\int_0^1 {P_{j,t}}^{1-\epsilon_P} dj\right)^{1/(1-\epsilon_P)}$ is an aggregate price level, W_t is a nominal wage rate, $C_t^K = \left(\int_0^1 \left(C_{j,t}^K\right)^{(\epsilon_P-1)/\epsilon_P} dj\right)^{\epsilon_P/(\epsilon_P-1)}$ is a composite consumption bundle, and Z_t^K denotes labor productivity of the Keynesians. They pick hours of work N_t^K to equate a real wage rate and a marginal rate of substitution:

$$Z_t^K \frac{W_t}{P_t} = \frac{v_N(N_t^K)}{u_C(C_t^K)}, \tag{7}$$

where a period utility function is $U(C^K, N^K) = u(C^K) - v(N^K)$, and subscripts C and N denote the first-derivative with respect to C and N, respectively.

On the other hand, the Ricardians maximize $E_t\left[\sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} \beta^\tau U(C_{t+\tau}^R, N_{t+\tau}^R)\right]$ subject to flow budget constraints:

$$P_{t+\tau} C_{t+\tau}^R + \frac{B_{t+\tau}^R}{1+i_{t+\tau}} = B_{t+\tau-1}^R + Z_{t+\tau}^R W_{t+\tau} N_{t+\tau}^R + \theta_D^R D_{t+\tau} - T_{t+\tau}, \tag{8}$$

where C_t^R and N_t^R are consumption and labor supply of the Ricardian agent, B_t^R is an amount of risk-free nominal bonds, i_t is a nominal interest rate, and Z_t^R is productivity of the Ricardians. D_t denotes aggregate dividends, and I assume that each Ricardian agent owns θ_D^R share of all of the firms. $\bar{s}^K$ and $\bar{s}^R$ represent population shares of the Keynesians and Ricardians, and therefore $\theta_D^R = 1/\bar{s}^R$. T_t is lump-sum taxes. The Ricardian's problem leads to the following optimality conditions:

$$1 = E_t\left[\beta \frac{u_C(C_{t+1}^R)}{u_C(C_t^R)} \frac{1+i_t}{1+\pi_{t+1}^P}\right], \tag{9}$$

$$Z_t^R \frac{W_t}{P_t} = \frac{v_N(N_t^R)}{u_C(C_t^R)}, \tag{10}$$

where π_t^P is price inflation.

Usually in TANK models, Z_t^K and Z_t^R are the same, and so earnings inequality is excluded from the analysis. I assume instead that $Z_t^K < Z_t^R$ to introduce distributional factors to the model. As Keynesians earn less and consume a larger fraction of marginal earnings increases than Ricardians, the MPCs decrease in earnings in my model, consistent with empirical evidence.

I assume that the coefficient of RRA of the consumption utility function $u(\cdot)$ at both $\bar{C}^K$ and $\bar{C}^R$ is the same and is denoted by $\gamma = -\frac{u_{CC}(\bar{C}^K)\bar{C}^K}{u_C(\bar{C}^K)} = -\frac{u_{CC}(\bar{C}^R)\bar{C}^R}{u_C(\bar{C}^R)}$, where a variable with a bar means its value at the steady state and double subscripts are for the second-derivative. Similarly, the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply at the steady state is denoted by $\varphi = \frac{v_{NN}(\bar{N}^K)\bar{N}^K}{v_N(\bar{N}^K)} = \frac{v_{NN}(\bar{N}^R)\bar{N}^R}{v_N(\bar{N}^R)}$.

Note that aggregate consumption and labor in efficiency unit can be written as follows:

$$C_t = \bar{s}^K C_t^K + \bar{s}^R C_t^R, \tag{11}$$

$$N_t = \bar{s}^K Z_t^K N_t^K + \bar{s}^R Z_t^R N_t^R. \tag{12}$$

I denote the consumption and labor shares of the Keynesians at the steady state by $\bar{s}_C^K = \frac{\bar{s}^K \bar{C}^K}{\bar{C}}$ and $\bar{s}_N^K = \frac{\bar{s}^K \bar{Z}^K \bar{N}^K}{\bar{N}}$, where $\bar{s}_C^R$ and $\bar{s}_N^R$ are defined accordingly.

Monopolistically competitive firms produce intermediate goods indexed by $j \in [0, 1]$. Firm j takes a demand curve $Y_{j,t} = \left(\frac{P_{j,t}}{P_t}\right)^{-\epsilon_P} Y_t$ as given when choosing its price $P_{j,t}$. Profit $D_{j,t}$ is given by $P_{j,t}Y_{j,t} - W_t N_{j,t} - \frac{\psi_P}{2}\left(\frac{P_{j,t}}{P_{j,t-1}} - 1\right)^2 P_t Y_t$ where the last term represents quadratic price-adjustment costs a la Rotemberg (1982). Each firm maximizes $E_t\left[\sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} Q_{t,t+\tau}^D D_{j,t+\tau}\right]$ subject to the demand curve and a production function $Y_{j,t+\tau} = A_{t+\tau}N_{j,t+\tau}$, where $Q_{t,t+\tau}^D = \beta^\tau \frac{u_C(C_{t+\tau}^R)}{u_C(C_t^R)}$. The first-order condition at a symmetric equilibrium is as follows:

$$Y_t - \mathcal{M}_P w_t \frac{Y_t}{A_t} + \frac{\psi_P}{\epsilon_P - 1}\pi_t^P\left(1 + \pi_t^P\right)Y_t - E_t\left[\frac{\psi_P}{\epsilon_P - 1} Q_{t,t+1}^D \pi_{t+1}^P \left(1 + \pi_{t+1}^P\right)^2 Y_{t+1}\right] = 0, \tag{13}$$

where $\mathcal{M}_P = \frac{\epsilon_P}{\epsilon_P - 1}$ is the steady state markup and w_t is a real wage rate.

Finally, the model's aggregate resource constraint and policy rule for the central bank are standard:

$$Y_t = C_t + G_t + \frac{\psi_P}{2}\left(\pi_t^P\right)^2 Y_t, \tag{14}$$

$$i_t = (1 - \rho_i)\bar{i} + \rho_i i_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_i)\left(\zeta_\pi \pi_t^P + \zeta_x x_t\right) + \sigma_i u_t^i, \tag{15}$$

where G_t represents government expenditure, x_t is an output gap $\check{Y}_t - \check{Y}_t^n = \log(Y_t/\bar{Y}) - \log(Y_t^n/\bar{Y})$, and Y_t^n is the level of output when prices are fully flexible. Similarly, other variables with a check mean log-deviations from their steady state values. I further define

ϕ_C as $\bar{C}/\bar{Y}$ and ϕ_G as $\bar{G}/\bar{Y}$.

An inequality shock is an exogenous force decreasing Z_t^K and increasing Z_t^R in such a way that $\bar{s}_N^K \check{Z}_t^K + \bar{s}_N^R \check{Z}_t^R = 0$ for all t. Thus, this shock that increases earnings inequality is a mean-preserving spread when working hours are equal to the steady state level. The first-order dynamics of the model can be described by three equations (15)-(17):

$$x_t = E_t\left[x_{t+1}\right] - \frac{1}{\tilde{\gamma}}\left(i_t - E_t\left[\pi_{t+1}^P\right] - r_t^n\right), \tag{16}$$

$$\pi_t^P = \beta E_t\left[\pi_{t+1}^P\right] + \tilde{\lambda} x_t, \tag{17}$$

where r_t^n is the real interest rate under flexible prices, $\tilde{\lambda} = \frac{\epsilon_P - 1}{\psi_P}\Delta$, $\tilde{\gamma} = \gamma\left(1 - \bar{s}_C^K \phi_C \frac{1+\varphi}{\gamma+\varphi}\Delta\right) / \left(\bar{s}_C^R \phi_C\right)$, and $\Delta = \left(\varphi + \frac{\bar{s}_N^R \gamma}{\bar{s}_C^R \phi_C}\right) / \left[1 - \left(\bar{s}_N^K - \frac{\bar{s}_N^R}{\bar{s}_C^R}\bar{s}_C^K\right)\frac{\gamma(1+\varphi)}{\gamma+\varphi}\right]$. The derivations of the equations are in Appendix D.1. Note that these equations are observationally equivalent to a standard three-equations NK model of Galí (2015) and Woodford (2003).

Inequality matters in this model in two ways. First, distributional parameters $\bar{s}_C^K$, $\bar{s}_N^K$, $\bar{s}_C^R$, and $\bar{s}_N^R$ affect how shocks are propagated by changing the slopes of the dynamic IS equation (16) and the Phillips curve (17). Second, the inequality shock has an effect on $\check{Y}_t^n$ and r_t^n.

I start with the slopes. While $\tilde{\lambda}$ and $\tilde{\gamma}$ are related to the distributional parameters in a complicated manner, there is an interesting special case when the consumption share and the earnings share of the Keynesians are the same, *i.e.*, $\bar{s}_C^K = \bar{s}_N^K$.[13] In this case, $\Delta = \varphi + \frac{\gamma}{\phi_C}$ and $\tilde{\lambda}$ is independent of the distributional parameters. However, the slope of the dynamic IS equation still depends on inequality. When $\bar{s}_C^K = 0$ (*i.e.*, there are no Keynesians), the aggregate elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) $\frac{1}{\tilde{\gamma}}$ is $\frac{\phi_C}{\gamma}$, recovering the RANK model of Woodford (2003, p.80). As $\bar{s}_C^K$ increases, $\tilde{\gamma}$ decreases or the aggregate EIS increases, if the coefficient of RRA γ is greater than 1.[14] This implies that the presence of hand-to-mouth agents amplifies the effects of real interest rates on aggregate demand.[15]

To study the effects of the inequality shocks, suppose that $\check{Z}_t^K$ follows an AR(1) process, $\check{Z}_t^K = \rho_Z \check{Z}_{t-1}^K - \sigma_Z u_t^Z$, where $0 < \rho_Z < 1$. The mean-preserving spread assumption, $\bar{s}_N^K \check{Z}_t^K + \bar{s}_N^R \check{Z}_t^R = 0$, implies that that $\check{Z}_t^R = \rho_Z \check{Z}_{t-1}^R + \sigma_Z \frac{\bar{s}_N^K}{\bar{s}_N^R} u_t^Z$, and so u_t^Z is a redistribution shock increasing earnings inequality. This shock affects the economy via both $\check{Y}_t^n$ and r_t^n. However,

[13] A sufficient condition for $\bar{s}_C^K = \bar{s}_N^K$ is $\phi_G = \frac{\bar{G}}{\bar{Y}} = \frac{1}{\epsilon_P}$. When the steady state price markup is 20 percent (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997), this corresponds to ϕ_G being equal to 17 percent.

[14] Precisely, the condition is that $\gamma + \phi_C(1+\varphi) > 1$.

[15] When $\bar{s}_C^K$ is very large, $\tilde{\gamma}$ becomes negative and an inverted aggregate demand logic of Bilbiie (2008) prevails.

when $\bar{s}_C^K = \bar{s}_N^K$, $\check{Y}_t^n$ becomes unrelated to the inequality shocks, and therefore u_t^Z propagates only through the natural rate of interest r_t^n.[16] One can show that

$$\frac{\partial E_t[r_{t+\tau}^n]}{\partial u_t^Z} = -\rho_Z^\tau \frac{\bar{s}_C^K}{\bar{s}_C^R} \frac{1+\varphi}{\gamma+\varphi} \gamma(1-\rho_Z)\sigma_Z \qquad < \qquad 0. \tag{18}$$

Note that this resembles how a contractionary discount rate shock in a RANK model works: when utility in the future is less discounted, r_t^n decreases and a representative agent consumes less as consumption in the future becomes more important. Therefore, the inequality shock in the simple TANK model is isomorphic to a demand shock in a RANK model. This further illustrates why individual heterogeneity can be a source of aggregate demand shocks in a representative agent framework.

Intuitively, $\check{C}_t^K$ is similar to $\check{Z}_t^K$, because the Keynesians are hand-to-mouth. On the other hand, the Ricardians want to smooth their consumption intertemporarily, and so $\check{C}_t^R$ is less volatile than $\check{Z}_t^R$. Given a large decrease in $\check{C}_t^K$ and a small increase in $\check{C}_t^R$ in response to the inequality shock, there are some negative responses in aggregate consumption $\check{C}_t$. This illustrates why u_t^Z is a negative aggregate demand shock.

Although the simple TANK model above is useful to build intuition, it cannot quantitatively rationalize the U-shaped responses of aggregate consumption estimated in Section 3. In the simple TANK model, $\check{C}_t$ decreases contemporaneously and returns monotonically to zero. While introducing habit formation in preferences for consumption is useful to induce hump-shaped dynamics in response to monetary policy shocks (Woodford, 2003), this is not the case for the inequality shocks. Because the Keynesians consume all of their labor earnings every period, habit formation does not play a central role and $\check{C}_t^K$ closely follows $\check{Z}_t^K$. While the dynamics of $\check{C}_t^R$ are affected by the consumption habit, it responds positively given an inequality shock that increases $\check{Z}_t^R$. By combining negative AR(1)-like dynamics of $\check{C}_t^K$ and positive hump-shaped responses of $\check{C}_t^R$, it is less likely that $\check{C}_t$ would decline in a U-shaped manner. To rationalize the empirical impulse responses and understand the mechanisms through which inequality shocks propagate, further enhancement is required in a model.

[16] When $\bar{s}_C^K \neq \bar{s}_N^K$, the inequality shock has a supply-side effect of altering $\check{Y}_t^n$. However, this effect is quite small as long as $\bar{s}_C^K$ is close to $\bar{s}_N^K$. See Appendix D.1 for an analysis of this general case.

5.2 The THINK Model and Its Quantitative Evaluation

The previous subsection analytically shows that the inequality shock reduces aggregate consumption demand. Here I examine the effects of the inequality shock quantitatively using a two-agent medium-sized DSGE model building on Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). The model combines temporarily hand-to-mouth and intertemporal (THI) agents and New Keynesian (NK) characteristics. When estimated by a Bayesian impulse response matching method of Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2010), the THINK model successfully generates large, U-shaped impulse responses comparable to the empirical ones.

5.2.1 Model

The THINK model extends the simple TANK model in several aspects. For individual heterogeneity, three new features are introduced: an endogenous extensive margin between the Keynesian and the Ricardian "families," a small amount of financial income for the Keynesians, and a decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA) consumption utility. Various characteristics of medium-sized RANK models are further incorporated such as investment and capital utilization adjustment costs, sticky wages, and habit formation in consumption preferences.

5.2.1.1 Keynesian and Ricardian Families

I introduce an extensive margin of being a credit constrained or unconstrained agent in the model, which makes the population shares of both families determined endogenously. Suppose that s_t^K and s_t^R are the number of members in each family in period t. The transition probability of becoming a Keynesian in period t among who were a Ricardian in period $t-1$ is denoted by q_t^{RK} and the other transition probabilities are denoted accordingly. The Keynesian family consists of agents who were either a Keynesian or a Ricardian in the previous period:

$$s_t^K = s_{t-1}^K q_t^{KK} + s_{t-1}^R q_t^{RK}. \tag{19}$$

It is clear that $q_t^{KR} = 1 - q_t^{KK}$, $q_t^{RR} = 1 - q_t^{RK}$, and $s_t^R = 1 - s_t^K$.

I assume that the probability of staying in the Keynesian family for an agent who was a

Keynesian in the previous period is as follows:

$$q_t^{KK} = \bar{q}^{KK}\left(\frac{Y_t}{\bar{Y}}\right)^{-\eta_Y}\left(\frac{s_{t-1}^K}{\bar{s}^K}\right)^{-\eta_s}, \qquad \eta_Y \geq 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \eta_s \in \mathbb{R}. \tag{20}$$

For special cases, the type of an agent is fixed when $\bar{q}^{KK} = 1$, $\eta_Y = 0$, $\eta_s = 0$, and $q_t^{RR} = 1$. If $\bar{q}^{KK} = \bar{s}^K$, $\eta_Y = 0$, $\eta_s = 0$, and $q_t^{RR} = \bar{s}^R$, agents are credit constrained in an identically and independently distributed manner. The parameter η_Y governs the cyclicality of q_t^{KK}. As documented by Guvenen, Ozkan and Song (2014), Ravn and Sterk (2017), and Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004), unemployment risk and idiosyncratic earnings risk are countercyclical. This implies that more people receive large negative idiosyncratic shocks and become credit constrained during recessions. A positive η_Y captures such dynamics by increasing q_t^{KK} when output Y_t is low. That is, it is hard to escape from a credit constraint during economic downturns. On the other hand, η_s influences the persistence of the number of credit constrained agents. For example, when $s_{t-1}^K > \bar{s}^K$, a positive η_s lowers the probability of staying in the Keynesian family, which increases the degree of mean-reversion in the number of credit constrained agents s_t^K.

The parameter η_Y can be micro-founded as follows. Suppose that earnings of agents who were credit constrained in the previous period are represented by an inverse Pareto distribution $\upsilon_{i,t}^{-1}Y_t$, where $\upsilon_{i,t} \sim \text{Pareto}(\eta_Y)$ for $\upsilon_{i,t} \geq \upsilon_m$. I assume further that one needs to earn more than a threshold to circumvent the credit constraint, where the threshold is an aggregate variable. In this setup, q_t^{KK} becomes proportional to $Y_t^{-\eta_Y}$. Intuitively, an increase in aggregate income affects individual earnings positively and this leads to fewer credit constrained agents. That is, "a rising tide lifts all boats." Furthermore, η_s can be related to the (negative) elasticity of the threshold earnings to the number of credit constrained agents at the steady state. For example, consider a case where there are more credit constrained agents than in the steady state. The additional credit constrained agents would have enough resources not to be constrained at the steady state, and therefore they are likely to be wealthier on average than those who would be credit constrained at the steady state. Because those additional credit constrained agents can sell illiquid assets for cash or pledgeable collateral, less earnings may be enough for these agents to escape from credit constraints. While such actions are not explicitly modeled here, a positive η_s reflects this channel by lowering the threshold earnings and making more agents circumvent credit constraints. On the other hand, banks may become reluctant to issue additional loans to households when many households are already borrowing from banks. Some of the potential borrowers may have poor credit condition, and therefore banks may have to pay additional efforts in screening. This implies that more earnings are required for some consumers not to be credit constrained. If this channel is important, η_s may be negative. Because the sign of η_s is not clear a priori, I let the support of this parameter include both positive and negative values for now and let the estimation later pin down a value. See Appendix D.2.3 for details of the microfoundation.

While one can impose a similar structure on q_t^{RK}, I shut down this channel and let $q_t^{RK} = \bar{q}^{RK}$ and $q_t^{RR} = \bar{q}^{RR}$. This is to keep the model parsimonious and keep my analysis focused. Furthermore, several log points deviations of q_t^{RK} from $\bar{q}^{RK}$ have little effect on s_t^K because $\bar{q}^{RK}$ is small in the benchmark parameters.[17]

I assume that each Keynesian receives a positive share θ_D^K of dividends. This is because even the wealth-poor households have some financial investments (Guiso and Sodini, 2013). One may also consider this income as including government transfers to the poor, or pensions. Finally, Kaplan, Violante and Weidner (2014) and Kaplan and Violante (2014) argue that there are agents who own a significant amount of assets but credit constrained because most of their wealth is illiquid. It is natural to suppose that such agents are credit constrained but receive some financial income.

Similarly, each Ricardian holds $\theta_{D,t}^R$ share of the stocks. Because the population shares of two families are time-varying, at least one of θ_D^K and $\theta_{D,t}^R$ should be also time-varying to satisfy $s_t^K \theta_D^K + s_t^R \theta_{D,t}^R = 1$. For simplicity, I fix θ_D^K and let $\theta_{D,t}^R$ be determined by s_t^K and s_t^R. Note that $\theta_{D,t}^R = \frac{1-\theta_D^K}{1-s_t^K} + \theta_D^K$, and therefore $\theta_{D,t}^R$ increases in s_t^K. This implies that financial assets are concentrated among fewer people (high $\theta_{D,t}^R$) in a recession when more agents are credit constrained (high s_t^K). Indeed, the correlation between the HP filtered top 10% wealth share of Saez and Zucman (2016) and log real GDP per capita is -0.26. Finally, I assume that a condition $\theta_D^K \leq \theta_{D,t}^R$ holds in all cases I study.

There is a continuum of agents in both families supplying different types of labor in a monopolistically competitive way. Subject to quadratic wage adjustment costs in a nominal

[17] Specifically, the log-linearized Equation (19) is that $\check{s}_t^K = \bar{q}^{KK}(\check{s}_{t-1}^K + \check{q}_t^{KK}) + \bar{q}^{KR}(\check{s}_{t-1}^R + \check{q}_t^{RK})$. Because $\check{s}_{t-1}^R = -\frac{\bar{s}^K}{\bar{s}^R}\check{s}_{t-1}^K$, the contribution of the time-varying $\check{q}_t^{RK}$ to $\check{s}_t^K$ depends on $\bar{q}^{KR} = \bar{q}^{RK}\frac{\bar{s}^R}{\bar{s}^K}$. Both $\bar{q}^{RK}$ and $\bar{q}^{KR}$ are tiny in the benchmark calibration, and therefore $\bar{q}^{KR}\check{q}_t^{RK}$ is negligible.

wage inflation $\pi_{l,t}^W$, a Keynesian worker has the following budget constraint:

$$P_t C_{l,t}^K = Z_t^K W_{l,t} N_{l,t}^K - \frac{\psi_W}{2}\left(\pi_{l,t}^W\right)^2 Z_t^K W_t N_t^K + \theta_D^K D_t. \tag{21}$$

The decisions on the wage rate and the hours are relegated to the type l labor union. The consumption utility $u\left(C_{l,t}^K - b^K C_{t-1}^K\right)$ features an external habit. The (negative) elasticity of the marginal utility function at the steady state is denoted by $\gamma^K = -\frac{u_{CC}(\bar{C}^K - b^K\bar{C}^K)\times(\bar{C}^K - b^K\bar{C}^K)}{u_C(\bar{C}^K - b^K\bar{C}^K)}$.

When a Ricardian becomes a Keynesian, one brings θ_D^K share of the stocks and leave all the other assets to the Ricardian family. On the other hand, when a Keynesian becomes a Ricardian, one carries all the wealth to the new family. Those assumptions make each Keynesian hold θ_D^K share while the number of Keynesians is not a constant. For equalizing financial resources available to the new and continuing Ricardians, an intra-family redistribution occurs, which is in a lump sum. A budget constraint for a type l Ricardian worker is given by

$$P_t C_{l,t}^R + \frac{B_{l,t}^R}{1+i_t} = B_{l,t-1}^R + Z_t^R W_{l,t} N_{l,t}^R - \frac{\psi_W}{2}\left(\pi_{l,t}^W\right)^2 Z_t^R W_t N_t^R + \theta_{D,t}^R D_t - T_t + R_t, \tag{22}$$

where R_t denotes the lump sum redistribution inside the Ricardian family.

I define b^R and γ^R similar to their Keynesian counterparts. Note that b^R and γ^R are not necessarily equal to b^K and γ^K. I instead consider decreasing relative risk aversion preferences in accordance with the empirical results of Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2009, Section IV.C). In the model, at the steady state, this corresponds to a condition that $\frac{\gamma^K}{1-b^K} \geq \frac{\gamma^R}{1-b^R}$. Agents are more relative risk averse in the Keynesian family where they consume less than in the Ricardian family.

5.2.1.2 Labor Market

Next, I turn to the labor market. I introduce labor unions whose preferences are based only on aggregate variables. By minimizing the effects of individual heterogeneity on the decision of labor unions, I can make the resulting wage Phillips curve similar to the RANK counterpart. This allows me to focus on the new features in the demand block, while reducing deviations in the supply block from the RANK model. I also show that a competitive labor market induces negatively correlated earnings inequality and consumption inequality, which is at odds with data. This finding further necessitates a non-competitive labor market institution such as labor unions.

A labor union for type l workers chooses a nominal wage rate $W_{l,t}$ and supplies $N_{l,t} = \left(\frac{W_{l,t}}{W_t}\right)^{-\epsilon_W} N_t$ in efficiency units, while taking W_t and $N_t = \left(\int_0^1 N_{l,t}^{\frac{\epsilon_W - 1}{\epsilon_W}} dl\right)^{\frac{\epsilon_W}{\epsilon_W - 1}}$ as given. The union should determine how to allocate the total labor $N_{l,t}$ to the Keynesian and the Ricardian workers. I assume that the union makes working hours of each agent be in proportion to their steady state values. Thus, $N_{l,t} = s_t^K Z_t^K N_{l,t}^K + s_t^R Z_t^R N_{l,t}^R$ where $\frac{N_{l,t}^K}{\bar{N}^K} = \frac{N_{l,t}^R}{\bar{N}^R}$ for all l and t. For example, when both agents work the same number of hours at the steady state ($\bar{N}^K = \bar{N}^R$), the type l union always assigns common labor hours to both Keynesians and Ricardians workers ($N_{l,t}^K = N_{l,t}^R$).

The utility function of the union l is denoted by U_l^L. Following Pencavel (1984), it is based on the total real earnings $e_{l,t}$ and the total labor supply $N_{l,t}$: $U_{l,t}^L = u^L\left(e_{l,t} - b^L e_{t-1}\right) - v^L\left(N_{l,t}\right)$ where $e_{l,t} = \left(W_{l,t}N_{l,t} - \frac{\psi_W}{2}\left(\pi_{l,t}^W\right)^2 W_t N_t\right)/P_t$ and $e_t = \left(W_t N_t - \frac{\psi_W}{2}\left(\pi_t^W\right)^2 W_t N_t\right)/P_t$.[18] Note that the earnings are subject to quadratic nominal wage adjustment costs, which induce sticky wages. The utility function u^L features an external habit and the elasticities of the marginal utilities u_e^L and v_N^L with respect to their inputs at the steady state are denoted by γ^L and φ, respectively. The first-order condition at a symmetric equilibrium for maximizing $E_t\left[\sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} \beta^\tau U_{l,t+\tau}^L\right]$ yields a standard wage Phillips curve, where the wage markup equals to $\frac{w_t}{v_N^L/u_e^L}$. Finally, the steady state wage markup is denoted by $\mathcal{M}_W = \frac{\epsilon_W}{\epsilon_W - 1}$.

One may instead consider a competitive labor market. For a simple exposition, suppose that $\gamma^K = \gamma^R = \gamma$ and $b^K = b^R = 0$. Then individual labor supply schedule becomes Equation (8) and (10), or $\check{Z}_t^\iota + \check{w}_t = \varphi \check{N}_t^\iota + \gamma \check{C}_t^\iota$ for $\iota \in \{K, R\}$ in log-linearization. For structural shocks not affecting $\check{Z}_t^R$ or $\check{Z}_t^K$ directly, we have $\gamma(\check{C}_t^R - \check{C}_t^K) = -\varphi(\check{N}_t^R - \check{N}_t^K)$. This implies that consumption inequality $\log\left(\frac{C_t^R}{C_t^K}\right)$ and earnings inequality $\log\left(\frac{Z_t^R N_t^R}{Z_t^K N_t^K}\right)$ are negatively correlated. Such prediction contradicts empirical findings of Coibion et al. (2017) that consumption inequality increases in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock, whereas earnings inequality is unresponsive. Therefore, I rule out a competitive labor market and take another widely used setup, labor unions and sticky wages.

[18] An alternative setup is to make labor unions maximize the average utility of members $E_t\left[\sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} \beta^\tau (s_{t+\tau}^K U_{l,t+\tau}^K + s_{t+\tau}^R U_{l,t+\tau}^R)\right]$ where $U_{l,t}^\iota = u\left(C_{l,t}^\iota - b^\iota C_{t-1}^\iota\right) - v\left(N_{l,t}^\iota\right)$ for all ι, l, and t. However, the model impulse responses under this setup are similar to what are obtained in the benchmark case. See Appendix D.2.2.2.

5.2.1.3 Firms, Monetary Policy, and Aggregate Resource Constraint

Here the production block is briefly discussed because it is similar to that of the RANK, where the details are relegated to Appendix D.2. A firm j selects four variables: a price $P_{j,t}$, a labor input $N_{j,t}$, investment $I_{j,t}$, and a capital utilization rate $\nu_{j,t}$ given $P_{j,t-1}$, $I_{j,t-1}$, and a firm-specific physical capital stock $\kappa_{j,t}$. A nominal profit, which is paid out as dividends, is given by:

$$D_{j,t} = P_{j,t}Y_{j,t} - W_t N_{j,t} - \frac{\psi_P}{2}\left(\pi^P_{j,t}\right)^2 P_t Y_t - P_t I_{j,t} - \Phi^\nu(\nu_{j,t}) P_t \kappa_{j,t}, \tag{23}$$

where the demand for good j is given by $Y_{j,t} = \left(\frac{P_{j,t}}{P_t}\right)^{-\epsilon_P} Y_t$. The third term represents nominal price adjustment costs, which make prices sticky. There are investment adjustment costs and the law of motion for the physical capital stock is $\kappa_{j,t+1} = (1-\delta)\kappa_{j,t} + \left(1 - \Phi^I\left(\frac{I_{j,t}}{I_{j,t-1}}\right)\right) I_{j,t}$. The last term in Equation (23) is for adjustment costs to capital utilization. Capital service $K_{j,t}$ is determined by the utilization rate and the physical capital stock: $K_{j,t} = \nu_{j,t}\kappa_{j,t}$. Finally, a Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed: $Y_{j,t} = A_t K^{1-\alpha}_{j,t} N^{\alpha}_{j,t}$.

The firm j maximizes the discounted dividends $E_t\left[\sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} Q^D_{t,t+\tau} D_{j,t+\tau}\right]$ subject to the constraints above. The stochastic discount factor $Q^D_{t,t+\tau}$ is based on the marginal consumption utilities weighted by the time-varying population and equity shares:

$$Q^D_{t,t+\tau} = \beta^\tau \frac{s^K_{t+\tau}\theta^K_D u^K_{C,t+\tau} + s^R_{t+\tau}\theta^R_{D,t+\tau} u^R_{C,t+\tau}}{s^K_t \theta^K_D u^K_{C,t} + s^R_t \theta^R_{D,t} u^R_{C,t}} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+\tau}}. \tag{24}$$

Finally, an aggregate resource constraint and a policy rule for the central bank are as follows:

$$Y_t = C_t + I_t + G_t + \frac{\psi_P}{2}\left(\pi^P_t\right)^2 Y_t + \frac{\psi_W}{2}\left(\pi^W_t\right)^2 N_t w_t + \Phi^\nu(\nu_t)\kappa_t, \tag{25}$$

$$i_t = (1-\rho_i)\bar{i} + \rho_i i_{t-1} + (1-\rho_i)(\zeta_\pi \pi^P_t + \zeta_Y \check{Y}_t) + \sigma_i u^i_t. \tag{26}$$

5.2.2 Calibration and Estimation

The THINK model has many parameters. This subsection discusses how those parameters are calibrated and estimated. I calibrate parameters when there are commonly used values or when the empirical impulse responses are less informative about them. This sharpens identification of the estimator by reducing the number of parameters to be estimated substantially. Then I estimate the other parameters including newly introduced ones such as η_Y, η_s, γ^K, and the ratio of the marginal consumption utilities $\bar{u}_C^K/\bar{u}_C^R$ at the steady state, where $\bar{u}^\iota \equiv u(\bar{C}^\iota - b^\iota \bar{C}^\iota)$ for $\iota \in \{K, R\}$. For estimation, I match the empirical and the model impulse responses in a Bayesian framework following Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2010). This limited information approach allows me to focus on several shocks of interests, while not being specific about the remaining part of the data generating process.

A list of parameters and their calibrated values can be found in Table 2. For example, $\beta = 0.99$ is determined by the steady state investment share $\phi_I \equiv \bar{I}/\bar{Y}$. Following Debortoli and Galí (2017), I assume that one-fifth of the population are Keynesian in the steady state. The consumption and earnings share of the Keynesians are based on those of the bottom quintile households sorted by wealth.[19] For the transition probability from the Ricardian family to the Keynesian family at the steady state $\bar{q}^{RK}$, I note that Equation (19) and (20) lead to

$$\check{s}_t^K = (\bar{q}^{KK} - \bar{q}^{KK}\eta_s - \bar{q}^{RK})\check{s}_{t-1}^K - \bar{q}^{KK}\eta_Y \check{Y}_t, \tag{27}$$

where $\bar{q}^{KK} = 1 - \bar{q}^{KR} = 1 - \frac{\bar{s}^R}{\bar{s}^K}\bar{q}^{RK}$. Because η_Y and η_s appear only in the above equation in the log-linearized system, I fix $\bar{q}^{RK}$ and estimate η_Y and η_s, where η_Y and η_s govern the cyclicality and the persistence of $\check{s}_t^K$, respectively. Assuming $\bar{q}^{RK} = 0.0025$ implies that 4.5 percent of the Ricardians will transition to the Keynesians after 5 years at the steady state transition rates. This is similar to the transition probability from positive to strictly negative net worth in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. For example, between 1984 and 1989 (1989 and 1994), the transition probability was 4.4 (4.7) percent in the data.

For adjustment cost parameters ψ_P and ψ_W, I make the slopes of the price and wage Phillips curves equal those implied by 75 percent of Calvo (1983) probabilities of non-adjustment. Finally, using $\bar{s}^K\bar{C}^K = \bar{s}_C^K\phi_C\bar{Y}$, $\bar{s}^K\bar{Z}^K\bar{N}^K\bar{w} = \bar{s}_N^K\mathcal{M}_P^{-1}\alpha\bar{Y}$, and Equation (21), one can show that $\theta_D^K = 0.44$. Because $\bar{s}^K = 0.2$, this means that about 9 percent of the total financial income goes to the Keynesians. This may reflect the presence of wealthy hand-to-mouth agents among the Keynesians, financial income taxation and government transfers, or pensions.

Next, I explain how the remaining parameters are estimated. Suppose that Ψ is a vector of impulse response coefficients of interests and an estimator $\hat{\Psi}$ has an asymptotic normal

[19] In light of the wealthy hand-to-mouth agents of Kaplan and Violante (2014), I later consider a case with higher $\bar{s}_C^K$ and $\bar{s}_N^K$. With different parameter estimates, the model generates similar dynamics of aggregate variables. (see Appendix D.2.2).

distribution $N(\Psi, V/T)$, where T is a sample size. The model parameters and the model-implied impulse responses are denoted by Θ and $\Psi(\Theta)$, respectively. A limited information likelihood $p(\hat{\Psi}|\Theta)$ of Kim (2002) is based on the distribution that $\hat{\Psi} \sim N(\Psi(\Theta), \hat{V}/T)$, where $\hat{V}$ is a diagonal matrix following Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2010). Given the likelihood and a prior on Θ, we can think of a posterior $p(\Theta|\hat{\Psi}) = p(\hat{\Psi}|\Theta)p(\Theta)/p(\hat{\Psi})$.

Ψ consists of responses of real GDP, consumption, investment, the GDP deflator, and EFFR to a one standard deviation shock to the inequality, MP, and TFP. I estimate the responsesof major macroeconomic variables to the MP and TFP shocks using local projections similar to Equation (5), where contemporaneous variables in $\mathbf{Z}_t^{(m)}$ are included only when the minimum delay assumption is relevant for the identification. Lags of the impulse response functions that are included in Ψ might matter for the estimation of Θ. Because the minimum delay assumptions are imposed for the inequality and MP shocks in the data, the contemporaneous responses are nil by construction. Obviously, this assumption may have further effects at short lags. On the other hand, the TFP shocks are free of such concerns, and the responses at short lags may provide useful information on the short-run dynamics. However, including all the lags only for the TFP shocks might overweight the impulse responses induced by the TFP shocks. Given these consideration, I use the responses at lags 0, 4, 5, ..., 12 and the initial responses are dropped when the minimum delay assumption is used for the identification. Because there are five variables and three shocks, Ψ includes $5 \times (13 - 3) \times 3 - 9 = 141$ moments in total. To simulate the posterior, I draw 200,000 observations using a random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm and drop the first 50,000 observations (see Herbst and Schorfheide, 2015). The acceptance rate of the Markov chain is 34 percent.

The results are summarized in Table 3. The Keynesian consumption habit parameter b^K is assumed to be 0 because pre-MCMC numerical optimizations assign 0 to b^K when it is also estimated. γ^K is 8.39 at the posterior mode, which is much greater than $\gamma^R = 2$. This is consistent with the view that agents become more risk averse when consuming less and being credit constrained. In line with this view and my results, Guiso and Sodini (2013) report that the 90th percentile of a cross-section of coefficients of RRA in the U.S. is 16.4. Given that the population share of the Keynesians is 20 percent and coefficients of RRA decrease in wealth, my estimate seems reasonable. Note also that '$\gamma^K - 1$' follows a gamma distribution a priori, and so γ^K estimates are always larger than 1.

$\Phi^{\nu}_{\nu\nu}(\bar{\nu})$ denotes the second derivative of the utilization adjustment cost function Φ^{ν} that is evaluated at the steady state. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) fix it at 0.000457, while the estimates of Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010, 2011) are about 0.15.[20] My estimate is 0.23, closer to that of Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti. The second derivative of the investment adjustment costs $\Phi^{I}_{II}(1)$ is 1.64, much smaller than 2.48 in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans or 3.14 in Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2011). Relatedly, the estimated process of the technology shock is less persistent than usual. For example, a half-life of the technology shock is 3 quarters given $\rho_A = 0.77$, while it takes more than 3 years given a standard estimate around 0.95. Thus, the THINK model can generate hump-shaped and persistent responses successfully with small investment adjustment costs and less persistent inputs.

The estimated ratio of the marginal consumption utilities at the steady state $\bar{u}^K_C/\bar{u}^R_C$ is 3.99. This means that the Keynesian values a marginal consumption good much more than the Ricardian. The support of η_s is $(-1, \infty)$ including negative values because the sign of η_s is ambiguous a priori as discussed before. Given the estimates for η_Y and η_s, Equation (27) becomes $\check{s}^K_t = 0.48\check{s}^K_{t-1} - 4.27\check{Y}_t$. Thus, a recession with a 1 percent decline in output increases the number of the Keynesians by $4.27 \times \bar{s}^K = 0.85$ percentage points.

My interpretation of the magnitude of σ_Z, which represents how much $\check{Z}^K_t$ decreases concurrently in response to a one standard deviation inequality shock, is as follows. Suppose that there exists a continuum of agents whose idiosyncratic log labor productivity is denoted by $z_{i,t}$. Let $\sigma(z_{i,t})$ be its cross-sectional standard deviation and y_t be the log P90/P10 index. If $z_{i,t}$ is normally distributed, $\sigma(z_{i,t}) = \frac{y_t}{2N^{-1}(0.9)}$, where $N^{-1}(\cdot)$ is the inverse cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. It is because $\log(P90/P50)$ and $\log(P50/P10)$ equal $N^{-1}(0.9)$ times the standard deviation for a normally distributed random variable. Furthermore, the population share of the Keynesians is 0.2, and so their productivity can be represented by the 10th percentile of $z_{i,t}$. This implies that $\log(Z^K_t) \approx N^{-1}(0.1)\sigma(z_{i,t})$.[21] By combining these two equations, I obtain an expression for Z^K_t and y_t that

$$\log(Z^K_t) \approx -\frac{y_t}{2}. \tag{28}$$

[20] $\Phi^{\nu}_{\nu}(\bar{\nu})$ and $\frac{\Phi^{\nu}_{\nu\nu}(\bar{\nu})}{\Phi^{\nu}_{\nu}(\bar{\nu})}$ in Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010) are about 0.03 and 5, respectively, implying that $\Phi^{\nu}_{\nu\nu}(\bar{\nu})$ is about 0.15, where Φ^{ν}_{ν} is the first derivative of Φ^{ν}. Phaneuf, Sims and Victor (2018) do a similar algebra for estimates in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and obtain 0.000457.

[21] Here I ignore the mean of $z_{i,t}$ for simplicity, because I only consider mean-preserving spreads.

As shown in Figure 6, y_t increases by 2 log points (annualized) or 0.5 log points at the quarterly frequency in response to a one standard deviation inequality shock. This translates into a 25 log basis points decrease in $\log(Z_t^K)$ according to Equation (28), which is similar to the posterior mode of σ_Z, 30 log basis points.

Figure 8 illustrates how major macroeconomic variables respond to a one standard deviation inequality shock in the model, when Θ equals the posterior mode. For the earnings inequality y_t in the bottom right panel, I use Equation (28) and plot $-2E_t\left[\check{Z}_{t+h}^K\right] \times 400$. The fit of the model is reasonably good in the sense that the peak effects and the shapes are similar. Although the model impulse responses have the peaks earlier than the empirical impulse responses, it is well known that it is hard to generate much delayed responses with purely forward-looking Phillips curves. Furthermore, the estimated model is good at replicating the empirical responses to the MP and TFP shocks (see Appendix D.2.2).

Dupor, Han and Tsai (2009) point out that estimated parameters by matching impulse responses heavily depend on which shock is studied. Similarly, I find that the estimates in Table 4 vary when impulse responses to each shock are used separately to estimate Θ. For example, γ^K based on the TFP shock is 13.28, much greater than that based on either the inequality shock (6.14) or the MP shock (8.14). On the other hand, using all three shocks gives a moderate estimate of 8.39. I also review a case where the Keynesians consume and earn more than the benchmark calibration in light of the wealthy hand-to-mouth agents in the Keynesian family. When I increase $\bar{s}_C^K$ and $\bar{s}_N^K$ by 4 percentage points, $\frac{\gamma^K}{1-b^K}$ and $\frac{\bar{u}_C^K}{\bar{u}_C^R}$ decrease and become closer to $\frac{\gamma^R}{1-b^R}$ and 1. This reduces heterogeneity in preferences between the two agents by making the coefficients of RRA and the marginal consumption utility alike. This change seems reasonable because idiosyncratic labor productivity and the level of individual consumption become less diverging between the Keynesians and Ricardians in this case.[22]

It is worth mentioning that the model impulse responses are robust to the different parameter estimates. For example, the estimates in 'All shocks', 'Inequality shock', and

[22] Interpretation of σ_Z also differs in this specification. Suppose that $z_{i,t} - \mu = \rho(z_{i,t-1} - \mu) + \epsilon_{i,t}$ where $\epsilon_{i,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_t^2)$ is independent across individual and time. In one extreme, the productivity distribution of the hand-to-mouth agents is ex ante similar to that of the others, but they receive a large idiosyncratic shock $\epsilon_{i,t}$ which makes their credit constraints bind. In this framework, shocks to $\log(Z_t^K)$ is more tightly related to the dispersion of $\epsilon_{i,t}$, not $z_{i,t}$, and, an inequality shock originates from an increase in σ_t^2. Given $\rho = 0.966$ and $\sigma_{t-1}^2 = \sigma_{t-2}^2 = \cdots = \bar{\sigma}^2 = 0.017$ from McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson (2016), a rise in the log P90/P10 index y_t by 2 log points (annualized) from its steady state value is induced by $\sigma_t^2 = 0.019 > \bar{\sigma}^2$. Then a shock to $\log(Z_t^K)$ is approximated by $N^{-1}(0.9) \times (\sigma_t - \bar{\sigma}) = 0.0094$. This is based on the extreme assumption of ex ante identical distributions, and the estimated σ_Z in the high $\bar{s}_C^K$ and $\bar{s}_N^K$ scenario is 0.0061, less than 0.0094.

'High $\bar{s}_C^K$ and $\bar{s}_N^K$' columns induce almost identical responses of key macroeconomic variables to the inequality shock (Appendix D.2.2). In other words, it is a robust prediction of the THINK model that the inequality shock reduces aggregate demand substantially. This calls for a further inspection on determinants of aggregate demand in the model, which is the topic for the next subsection.

5.2.3 Aggregate Demand in the THINK Model

This subsection studies amplification and propagation mechanisms of the inequality shock in the THINK model with a focus on aggregate demand. I investigate where the large, U-shaped decline in aggregate demand comes from and how they are related to the new features in the model. Below I discuss C_t^K, C_t^R, I_t, and C_t in order.

I begin with the consumption of the Keynesians (C_t^K). They are hand-to-mouth and their consumption is determined by income as in Equation (21). When the inequality shock lowers the labor productivity of the Keynesians (Z_t^K), they lose earnings and reduce consumption. However, this 'direct effect' may be important only for the first few quarters for three reasons. First, the population share of the Keynesians (s_t^K) is only about 20 percent, and their consumption share is even less. Second, Z_t^K is not very persistent. Its half-life is about 3 quarters given $\rho_Z = 0.77$. Lastly, the dividend income plays a role of countercyclical transfers. It is because the price markup is countercyclical conditional on the inequality shock, and so are the dividends. This more or less offsets the effects of the decline in labor productivity on consumption.

The Ricardians are aware that there is a chance of receiving large negative idiosyncratic shocks and being credit constrained in the next period. Therefore, the Euler equation for the Ricardians becomes

$$1 = E_t \left[\beta \frac{q_{t+1}^{RR} u_{C,t+1}^R + q_{t+1}^{RK} u_{C,t+1}^K}{u_{C,t}^R} \frac{1 + i_t}{1 + \pi_{t+1}^P} \right], \tag{29}$$

where $u_{C,t}^\iota \equiv u' \left(C_t^\iota - b^\iota C_{t-1}^\iota \right)$ for $\iota \in \{K, R\}$. Note that there is a new element in the stochastic discount factor reflecting precautionary motivations. This raises the Ricardian's propensity to save and lowers the interest rate. For example, at the steady state, $1 + \bar{i} = \beta^{-1} \left[1 + \bar{q}^{RK} \left(\frac{\bar{u}_C^K}{\bar{u}_C^R} - 1 \right) \right]^{-1} < \beta^{-1}$, because $\bar{u}_C^K > \bar{u}_C^R$. As a result, the benchmark value of $\bar{i}$ is only 0.0022, while β is 0.99. When log-linearized around the steady state, the Euler equation becomes

$$\check{u}^R_{C,t} = \beta(1+\bar{i})\left(\bar{q}^{RR}E_t\left[\check{u}^R_{C,t+1}\right] + \bar{q}^{RK}\frac{\bar{u}^K_C}{\bar{u}^R_C}E_t\left[\check{u}^K_{C,t+1}\right]\right) + \left(\check{i}_t - E_t\left[\pi^P_{t+1}\right]\right), \tag{30}$$

where $\check{i}_t \equiv \log(\frac{1+i_t}{1+\bar{i}}$. The two non-standard aspects in Equation (30) reflects precautionary motivation in the THINK model. First, $\beta(1+\bar{i}) < 1$, and so Equation (30) resembles the discounted Euler equation of McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson (2017). Second, the Ricardians care for not only $\check{u}^R_{C,t+1}$, but also $\check{u}^K_{C,t+1}$, because of the uninsurable idiosyncratic risk.

The inequality shock is a positive productivity shock to the Ricardians. Thus, they will increase their consumption in response, but with some endogenous delay. There are two reasons for the delay. First, $u^R_{C,t}$ features consumption habits. Second, the inequality shock reduces $E_t\left[\check{C}^K_{t+1}\right]$, or equivalently increases $E_t\left[\check{u}^K_{C,t+1}\right]$. When being credit constrained is a more unpleasant experience than usual, the Ricardians become more cautious (save more for the future and consume less today). In Equation (30), an increase in $E_t\left[\check{u}^K_{C,t+1}\right]$ leads to an increase in $\check{u}^R_{C,t}$, corresponding to a decrease in C^R_t. The fact that the coefficients of RRA decrease, (*i.e.*, γ^K is greater than $\frac{\gamma^R}{1-b^R}$), further amplifies this effect, because $\check{u}^K_{C,t+1} = -\gamma^K\check{C}^K_{t+1}$ and $\check{u}^R_{C,t} = -\frac{\gamma^R}{1-b^R}(\check{C}^R_t - b^R\check{C}^R_{t-1})$. When the Keynesians reduce consumption, the marginal consumption utility increases faster than the Ricardians, and therefore $\check{C}^R_t$ should decrease more. For these reasons, $\check{C}^R_t$ responds to the inequality shock in a hump-shaped manner, and the initial increase in $\check{C}^R_t$ is rather muted. This helps the concurrent decline in $\check{C}^K_t$ to propagate and to reduce aggregate demand. However, it is clear that the 'direct effect' on $\check{C}^R_t$ cannot drive a recession in response to the inequality shock, because the Ricardians increase their consumption.

Another component of aggregate demand is investment. The two-agent structure adds a new dynamic to it through the discount factor $Q^D_{t,t+\tau} = \beta^\tau \frac{s^K_{t+\tau}\theta^K_D u^K_{C,t+\tau} + s^R_{t+\tau}\theta^R_{D,t+\tau}u^R_{C,t+\tau}}{s^K_t\theta^K_D u^K_{C,t} + s^R_t\theta^R_{D,t}u^R_{C,t}}\frac{P_t}{P_{t+\tau}}$ in Equation (24). In response to the inequality shock, $u^K_{C,t}$ increases a lot, because C^K_t decreases and γ^K is high. In other words, one more unit of financial income becomes much valuable when constrained agents have to reduce their consumption significantly. As a result, the utility value of the current marginal profit $s^K_t\theta^K_D u^K_{C,t} + s^R_t\theta^R_{D,t}u^R_{C,t}$ increases and $Q^D_{t,t+\tau}$ decreases. While the other terms in $Q^D_{t,t+\tau}$ may vary, the marginal utilities are the most important driver of $Q^D_{t,t+\tau}$ quantitatively (see Appendix D.2.5).

A decline in $Q^D_{t,t+\tau}$ leads to a lower value of a physical capital today. Firm's optimality condition related to the shadow value of a one unit of physical capital, denoted by q_t^κ, is as follows:

$$q_t^\kappa = E_t \left\{ \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} Q_{t,t+\tau}^D \frac{P_{t+\tau}}{P_t} (1-\delta)^{\tau-1} \left[r_{t+\tau}^K \nu_{t+\tau} - \Phi^\nu(\nu_{t+\tau}) \right] \right\}, \tag{31}$$

where r_t^K is the shadow value of a one unit of capital service K_t. Therefore, q_t^κ decreases as $Q_{t,t+\tau}^D$ lowers the current value of a physical capital, and so firms reduce investments accordingly.

Now I combine the discussions so far and look at aggregate consumption in detail. The following decomposition of aggregate consumption into several pieces highlights a key, new characteristic of the THINK model. By log-linearizing $C_t = s_t^K C_t^K + s_t^R C_t^R$, one obtains:

$$\check{C}_t = \bar{s}_C^K \check{C}_t^K + \bar{s}_C^R \check{C}_t^R + \left(\bar{s}_C^K - \bar{s}_C^R \frac{\bar{s}^K}{\bar{s}^R} \right) \check{s}_t^K. \tag{32}$$

The first and second terms represent the direct effects. When the inequality shock reduces $\check{Z}_t^K$, consumption of the Keynesians decrease while the opposite holds for the Ricardians. Those direct effects constitute all of aggregate consumption responses in other TANK models where agents' types are fixed. However, my model features an additional channel of distributional effects. In the THINK model, higher $\check{s}_t^K$ leads to lower aggregate consumption, because individuals who become credit constrained reduce their consumption substantially. The last term in Equation (32) represents this channel, where the coefficient on $\check{s}_t^K$ is negative when the consumption share of the Keynesian is less than their population share at the steady state ($\bar{s}_C^K < \bar{s}^K$), or equivalently, $\bar{C}^K < \bar{C}^R$. Because $\check{s}_t^K$ is countercyclical as illustrated in Equation (27), this channel can amplify aggregate fluctuations.

How the three terms in Equation (32) and aggregate consumption react to a one standard deviation inequality shock is depicted in Figure 9. The left panel is based on the benchmark parameters and the right one is for the high $\bar{s}_C^K$ and $\bar{s}_N^K$ case. As discussed above, the direct effects to the Keynesians contribute little to the responses of aggregate consumption after a few quarters. While it is more important in the high $\bar{s}_C^K$ and $\bar{s}_N^K$ case, it is not the most important component of $\check{C}_t$ at least after a year. Besides, the direct effects to the Ricardians are positive. Thus, the negative and U-shaped responses of aggregate consumption are mostly driven by the distributional effects.

Recall that the inequality shock decreases investment significantly. This negative effect to aggregate demand, combined with the direct effects to the Keynesian consumption, lowers economic output. When the economy turns into a recession, idiosyncratic earnings risk increases and some Ricardians become Keynesians. Then their consumption decreases, which further reduces aggregate demand. As a result, output decreases, more Ricardians become Keynesians, and so on. This aggregate demand spiral amplifies the distributional effects substantially and makes it the most important determinant of aggregate consumption.[23]

It is clear from equations (27) and (32) that the value of η_Y is crucial for determining the magnitude of the distributional effects. However, it is hard to estimate η_Y directly from (27), because there is no available quarterly time series data of s_t^K. Therefore, I take an indirect route to supplement the discussion and make three points on η_Y. First, the Great Recession was a period when access to credit was limited and as a result many people were credit constrained (Mian, Rao and Sufi, 2013; Mian and Sufi, 2015). This is consistent with an implication of a positive η_Y in the model that the number of credit constrained agents increases in recessions. Second, unemployment risk may contribute to the countercyclical variations in $\check{s}_t^K$ significantly. Given $\eta_Y = 4.32$ and other parameters, Equation (27) becomes $\check{s}_t^K = 0.48\check{s}_{t-1}^K - 4.27\check{Y}_t$. Thus, the semi-elasticity of s_t^K with respect to output is $\frac{\partial s_t^K}{\partial \check{Y}_t} = -4.27 \times \bar{s}^K = -0.85$, meaning that the population share of the Keynesian family increases by 0.85 percentage points when output decreases by 1 percent. A similar semi-elasticity of unemployment rate with respect to real GDP per capita in the U.S. is -0.44 based on the HP filtered quarterly series. Because there also exists earnings risk conditional on being employed (Guvenen, Ozkan and Song, 2014), the implied sensitivity of $\check{s}_t^K$ to $\check{Y}_t$ in the model may not be unreasonably large. Finally, one may rely on the micro-foundation in Section 5.2.1 and infer η_Y from the left-tail of the earnings distribution. The micro-foundation assumes that the left-tail of the earnings distribution can be approximated by an inverse Pareto random variable $\upsilon_{i,t}^{-1}Y_t$, where $\upsilon_{i,t} \sim \text{Pareto}(\eta_Y)$ for $\upsilon_{i,t} \geq \upsilon_m$. It follows that the log cumulative distribution function is linear in the log earnings with a slope η_Y in the left-tail, and this can be estimated from the QCEW. For example, the estimate is 5.04 based on the data in the first quarter of 2000. One need to exercise caution when

[23] Auclert and Rognlie (2018) also study how an earnings inequality shock affects economic output in their HANK model and find little aggregate effects. However, the model of Auclert and Rognlie features a CRRA preference, flexible prices, and no autoregressive term in the monetary policy rule, unlike my THINK model. When I make the THINK model similar to the model of Auclert and Rognlie by changing parameters as $\gamma^K = \gamma^R$, $b^K = b^R = 0$, $\mathcal{M}_P = 1$, $\psi_P = 0$, and $\rho_i = 0$, the THINK model also predicts little effects of an inequality shock on real variables. Furthermore, each of the factors above is important for rationalizing the large, U-shaped, estimated responses in Section 4. For example, when I fix ρ_i at 0 while not changing the other parameters, the peak effect of an inequality shock on real GDP becomes less than half of the benchmark case (see Appendix D.2.4).

relating this estimate to η_Y in the model because of measurement errors, minimum wages, and unemployment risk. Nevertheless, the estimate for η_Y (4.32) may not be unrealistic in light of the micro-founded slope coefficient (5.04). See Appendix D.2.3 for details on this estimation.

So far, I have shown how inequality can be a source of demand-driven business cycles. I introduce three new features to the THINK model, an extensive margin of being credit constrained, DRRA preferences, and a small amount of financial income for the Keynesians. Equipped with the new channels, I illustrate how they can rationalize the large, U-shaped, empirical impulse responses of aggregate variables. In doing so, I use solution and estimation methods developed for linear systems. However, inequality may have a non-linear effect on an economy by altering how it responds to policies and other structural shocks. An analysis of those effects requires a separate approach because of its non-linear nature.

6 Inequality and the Power of Stabilization Policies

This section covers policy implications of rising inequality in the U.S. based on the non-linear dynamics of the THINK model. Intuitively, there are more earnings- or wealth-poor people in an economy when the level of inequality is higher. They have higher MPCs and an interaction effect between more people and higher MPCs can make aggregate consumption demand more sensitive to economic conditions and policies. Consistent with the intuition, the THINK model predicts that the power of stabilization policies increases in the level of inequality. Empirical evidence based on various datasets is also in line with the prediction. On top of my findings that inequality and redistributive factors can drive macroeconomic fluctuations, this policy implication provides another reason why understanding inequality is important for policymakers.

6.1 Policy Implications of the THINK Model

For understanding the relationship between the power of stabilization policies and the level of inequality, the following decomposition of aggregate consumption in the THINK model is useful. Let $ds_t^K \equiv s_t^K - \bar{s}^K$ and other linear deviations be denoted similarly. From

$C_t = s_t^K C_t^K + s_t^R C_t^R$, it follows that

$$dC_t = \bar{s}^K dC_t^K + \bar{s}^R dC_t^R + (\bar{C}^K ds_t^K + \bar{C}^R ds_t^R) + (ds_t^K dC_t^K + ds_t^R dC_t^R). \tag{33}$$

Note that this is an exact equation, not an approximation. When compared to the log-linear approximation in Equation (32), it is clear that the first three terms in Equation (33) correspond to the direct effects to the Keynesian consumption, the direct effects to the Ricardian consumption, and the distributional effects in Equation (32). However, there exists an additional term representing the interaction effect between distribution (ds_t^K and ds_t^R) and marginal propensities to consume (dC_t^K and dC_t^R). Thus, aggregate consumption demand may become more sensitive to policies when there are more agents with higher MPCs. If the same mechanism applies to other structural shocks, aggregate fluctuations may become larger and macroeconomic volatility in general may be elevated. On the bright side, however, stabilization policies become more powerful too.

Note that high inequality corresponds to high s_t^K in the discussion above. This is because more earnings or income inequality implies that there are more people with higher MPCs at the bottom of wealth distribution. For example, Wolff (2017) reports that the share of households holding non-positive (less than $5,000 constant 1995 dollars) net worth increased by about 6 (13) percentage points from 1969 to 2013 in the U.S.

I consider two initial states of the model economy: high and low inequality. In the high (low) inequality state, s_{t-1}^K is 0.25 (0.15) and all the other variables equal their steady state values, where the range of 10 pernetage points is about the midpoint between 6 and 13 percentage points of Wolff (2017). To evaluate the non-linear dynamics of the THINK model, I employ a third-order pruned state-space system approach of Andreasen, Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2017) and the generalized impulse response functions of Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996). The responses of aggregate consumption conditional on both states are plotted in Figure 10. The left panel illustrates the generalized impulse response functions to a one standard deviation contractionary monetary policy shock, while the right one is for an expansionary fiscal policy shock. It is clear from both panels that aggregate consumption reacts more strongly to the policy shocks when the level of inequality is higher. This implies more powerful stabilization policies conditional on the higher level of inequality, and the results for other variables are similar (Appendix E.3).

The discussion so far illustrates a mechanism through which the level of inequality can affect propagation of structural shocks. Among many structural shocks, I concentrate on monetary and fiscal policy shocks and derive novel policy implications. In the next subsection, I investigate several datasets to test this theoretical prediction and find qualitatively consistent results.

6.2 Empirical Evidence

Here I test the theoretical prediction above empirically using U.S. data. The main idea is to include an interaction term between an inequality measure and a structural shock in local projections. If the coefficient is statistically and economically significant, I would conclude that inequality matters for the propagation and amplification of stabilization policies.

I examine three different datasets for robustness of the results. The first dataset consists of quarterly observations of earnings inequality, various aggregate variables, and several structural shocks in recent decades. The second dataset includes an annual but long history of income inequality, some aggregate variables, and a military news shock. The last one is based on state-level annual series of income inequality, real GDP, and military procurement spending since the 1960s. For identification, I exploit time series variation in the first two datasets and variation across states and time in the last dataset. For all the data, shocks, and specifications, the results consistently imply that more inequality leads to larger responses to policy shocks of the same size, consistent with the theoretical policy implications of my THINK model.

6.2.1 Recent Data

The first dataset consists of quarterly observations including the MP and FP shocks in Section 3, my log P90/P10 index based on the QCEW, and key macroeconomic variables in Section 4.[24] I consider the following local projections with an interaction term:

$$m_{t+h} - m_{t-1} = \beta_h x_t + \gamma_h x_t y_{t-1} + \Gamma'_{xy,h} \mathbf{Z}^{(xy)}_{t-1} + u^{(xy)}_{t,h}. \tag{34}$$

Given an impulse of a unit structural shock x_t, a macroeconomic variable m_t responds by $\beta_h + \gamma_h y_{t-1}$ after h periods, where y_{t-1} is the inequality index in the previous quarter. The way m_t reacts to the shock x_t depends on the state of inequality y_{t-1}, and the dependence

[24]See Appendix E.1 for the TFP shocks.

is parametrized by γ_h. $\mathbf{Z}_{t-1}^{(xy)}$ includes an intercept and four lags of x_t, y_t, $x_t y_{t-1}$, Δm_t, and $\Delta m_t y_t$. The sample period is from 1978:Q1 to 2008:Q4.

The left panel of Figure 11 shows the results for real consumption in response to a one standard deviation contractionary MP shock conditional on y_{t-1} being plus or minus one standard deviation from the average. It is clear that the contractionary effects of the MP shock is much stronger when earnings inequality is higher. For example, the t-statistic for the null hypothesis that $\gamma_{14} = 0$ is -5.15, and so $\hat{\gamma}_{14}$ is statistical significant at the 1% level. The right panel is for a one standard deviation expansionary FP shock conditional on the same values of y_{t-1}. Similarly, consumption increases more when earnings are more unequally distributed. The t-statistic for $\gamma_8 = 0$ is 2.91 and the $p-$value is only 0.002. Thus, I conclude that high earnings inequality makes contractionary MP shocks more contractionary and expansionary FP shocks more expansionary. The estimates for other variables such as real GDP, investment, price level, and unemployment rate are in line with the findings here (Appendix E.1).

6.2.2 Historical Data

Although the results above are intriguing, one may worry about a rising trend in inequality during the sample period. In the worst case, earnings inequality might be just capturing a trend in the U.S. economy becoming more volatile due to some other reasons.

To address this concern, I look at a long history of inequality and economic growth in the U.S. throughout the 20th century. The top 10% income share of Piketty and Saez (2003) serves the purpose well because it starts from 1917. Importantly for my identification, it follows a U-shaped pattern instead of an upward trend.

The cost of extending the sample backward is that there are not many reliable identified shock series available. A narrative measure of military news shock constructed by Ramey and Zubairy (2018) is an exception. It dates back to 1889. Ramey and Zubairy also provide real GDP, price level, and unemployment rates in addition to the military news shock. By combining the two sources, the sample spans from 1917 to 2015.

I estimate Equation (34) using the historical data, where the dependent variable is the real GDP per capita. As illustrated in Figure 12, the U.S. economy responds more strongly to the military news shocks when the top 10 percent takes more income. For example, a military news shock whose present-discounted value is 10 percent of the trend GDP increases real GDP per capita by 4 percent after 3 years when the top 10% income share is 43.9 percent.

However, the same shock raises real GDP per capita only by 1.5 percent when the top 10% holds 32.6 percent of income. Also, the t-statistic for $\gamma_3 = 0$ is 4.81 and the null is rejected at the 1 percent level. Similarly, GDP deflator and the unemployment rate react more strongly conditional on higher inequality (Appendix E.2).

6.2.3 State-level Data

Finally, I compare states with different levels of inequality. For inequality, I employ Frank-Sommeiller-Price series for the top 10% income share by state (Frank et al., 2015). This series is constructed by applying methods similar to Piketty and Saez (2003) at the state-level. For real state GDP, price level, employment, population, and most importantly, military procurement spending, I use the data from Nakamura and Steinsson (2014). The sample period is from 1969 to 2008.

Let $m_{i,t}$, $g_{i,t}$, and $y_{i,t}$ be real GDP per capita, real military procurement spending per capita, and top 10% income share in state i in year t. m_t and g_t without subscript i refer to the same variables at the U.S. level. Instrumental variables $D_i \cdot \frac{g_t - g_{t-1}}{m_{t-1}}$ for all i are used for the first two regressors in Equation (35), where D_i is a dummy variable for state i:

$$\frac{m_{i,t+h} - m_{i,t-1}}{m_{i,t-1}} = \beta_h \frac{g_{i,t} - g_{i,t-1}}{m_{i,t-1}} + \gamma_h \frac{g_{i,t} - g_{i,t-1}}{m_{i,t-1}} \cdot y_{i,t-1} + \Gamma'_{i,t,h} \mathbf{Z}_{i,t} + u_{i,t,h}. \tag{35}$$

$\mathbf{Z}_{i,t}$ includes time and state fixed-effects, $\frac{m_{i,t-1} - m_{i,t-2}}{m_{i,t-2}}$, and $y_{i,t-1}$. Standard errors are clustered by state.

When the aggregate military expenditures increase, some states receive more military spending or have higher income inequality on top of that. My identifying assumption, similar to that of Nakamura and Steinsson, is that the U.S. does not engage in aggregate military buildups because these states are experiencing or expected to suffer from sluggish growth relative to the others.

The estimated γ_h in Table 5 is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level for $h = 1, 2$, and 3. To fix the idea, consider $h = 2$, and a military spending shock amounts to 1% of real state GDP, *i.e.*, $\frac{g_{i,t} - g_{i,t-1}}{m_{i,t-1}} = 0.01$. Real state GDP per capita responds insignificantly when the top 10% share is only 30 percent. However, when $y_{i,t-1}$ is 40 (50) percent, the response becomes 5.03 (11.89) percent and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In other words, fiscal expansion becomes more powerful in states where income inequality is higher.

In summary, I look at the three datasets so far and rely on several variation to identify the effects of the level of inequality on the propagation of monetary and fiscal policies. Those results provide a set of extensive empirical facts consistent with the policy implication of the THINK model that the power of stabilization policies increases in the level of inequality.

7 Conclusion

The Great Recession stimulated interest in how inequality, aggregate fluctuations, and stabilization policies are related. For example, policymakers have become concerned about the distributional effects of stabilization policies in addition to their aggregate effects. Another important issue is to understand the direction from inequality to business cycles. If redistribution and inequality affect aggregate demand and how shocks propagate, policymakers should incorporate such considerations when they design policies to stabilize the economy. This paper explored these important relationships both empirically and theoretically.

Using a new quarterly measure of earnings inequality based on high-quality administrative data, I illustrate that inequality matters for policymakers in three aspects. First, earnings inequality reacts to shocks to fiscal policy and total factor productivity at business cycle frequencies. Second, unanticipated increases in earnings inequality induce recessions by reducing aggregate demand. Lastly, high levels of inequality make stabilization policies more powerful.

I further develop a new, tractable theoretical framework for studying the interaction between inequality, business cycles, and stabilization policies. This framework rationalizes my empirical findings and provides novel insights on the mechanisms through which inequality affects aggregate demand and the power of stabilization policies. The simplicity of the approach can help researchers easily link models to data, and thus stimulate further research in this area which historically relied on computationally intensive heterogeneous agent models.

My results may have implications for other macroeconomic phenomena. For example, inequality shocks may have contributed to slow recoveries from the Great Recession. The unanticipated inequality shocks are mostly positive between 2006:Q3 and 2008:Q4. This may be related to the large, prolonged decline in economic activity afterwards, because the impulse responses of real GDP to inequality shocks are persistent. Furthermore, my finding may provide a new interpretation of (a possible end of) the Great Moderation based on an upward trend in inequality. As discussed in Section 6, aggregate consumption demand can be more sensitive to economic condition when the level of inequality is higher. Because inequality has been rising in recent decades, this implies the level of cyclical volatility has been also rising, which may mean an end of the Great Moderation. Finally, my THINK model predicts that fiscal multipliers can increase in recessions. In the model, the number of credit constrained agents is countercyclical, and therefore there are more agents with higher MPCs during economic downturns. This makes aggregate consumption demand sensitive to shocks, which leads to large fiscal multipliers. Rigorous investigation of these hypotheses is left for future research.

Incorporating new features introduced in the THINK model into a heterogeneous agent framework is another topic for future research. Fully-specified HANK models where agents are endogenously credit constrained may provide an useful laboratory for studying the interaction between inequality and business cycles.

References

Acharya, Sushant, and Keshav Dogra. 2018. "Understanding HANK: Insights from a PRANK." *Manuscript.*

Alesina, Alberto, and Roberto Perotti. 1996. "Income distribution, political instability, and investment." *European Economic Review* 40(6): 1203–1228.

Andreasen, Martin M., Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, and Juan F. Rubio-Ramírez. 2017. "The pruned state-space system for non-linear DSGE models: Theory and empirical applications." *Review of Economic Studies* 85(1): 1–49.

Auclert, Adrien. 2017. "Monetary Policy and the Redistribution Channel." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 23451.

Auclert, Adrien, and Matthew Rognlie. 2018. "Inequality and aggregate demand." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 24280.

Auerbach, Alan J., and Yuriy Gorodnichenko. 2012. "Measuring the output responses to fiscal policy." *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 4(2): 1–27.

Autor, David H., Lawrence F. Katz, and Melissa S. Kearney. 2008. "Trends in US wage inequality: Revising the revisionists." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 90(2): 300–323.

Barsky, Robert B., and Eric R. Sims. 2012. "Information, animal spirits, and the meaning of innovations in consumer confidence." *American Economic Review* 102(4): 1343–77.

Basu, Susanto, John G. Fernald, and Miles S. Kimball. 2006. "Are technology improvements contractionary?" *American Economic Review* 96(5): 1418–1448.

Beaudry, Paul, and Franck Portier. 2006. "Stock prices, news, and economic fluctuations." *American Economic Review* 96(4): 1293–1307.

Bilbiie, Florin O. 2008. "Limited asset markets participation, monetary policy and (inverted) aggregate demand logic." *Journal of Economic Theory* 140(1): 162–196.

Bilbiie, Florin O. 2017. "The New Keynesian cross: Understanding monetary policy with hand-to-mouth households." CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11989.

Bilbiie, Florin O., André Meier, and Gernot J. Müller. 2008. "What accounts for the changes in US fiscal policy transmission?" *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking* 40(7): 1439–1470.

Blank, Rebecca M., and Alan S. Blinder. 1986. "Macroeconomics, income distribution, and poverty." In *Fighting Poverty: What Works and What Does Not.* , ed. Sdon Danziger. Cambridge:Harvard University Press.

Bordo, Michael D., and Christopher M. Meissner. 2012. "Does inequality lead to a financial crisis?" *Journal of International Money and Finance* 31(8): 2147–2161.

Braun, R. Anton, and Tomoyuki Nakajima. 2012. "Uninsured countercyclical risk: an aggregation result and application to optimal monetary policy." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 10(6): 1450–1474.

Cairó, Isabel, and Jae Sim. 2017. "Income inequality, financial crisis and monetary policy." *Manuscript.*

Calvet, Laurent E., John Y. Campbell, and Paolo Sodini. 2009. "Fight or flight? Portfolio rebalancing by individual investors." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124(1): 301–348.

Calvo, Guillermo A. 1983. "Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 12(3): 383–398.

Campbell, John Y., and N. Gregory Mankiw. 1989. "Consumption, income, and interest rates: Reinterpreting the time series evidence." *NBER Macroeconomics Annual* 4: 185–216.

Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles L. Evans. 2005. "Nominal rigidities and the dynamic effects of a shock to monetary policy." *Journal of Political Economy* 113(1): 1–45.

Christiano, Lawrence J., Mathias Trabandt, and Karl Walentin. 2010. "DSGE models for monetary policy analysis." In *Handbook of Monetary Economics*. Vol. 3, 285–367. Elsevier.

Coibion, Olivier. 2012. "Are the effects of monetary policy shocks big or small?" *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 4(2): 1–32.

Coibion, Olivier, and Yuriy Gorodnichenko. 2012. "What can survey forecasts tell us about information rigidities?" *Journal of Political Economy* 120(1): 116–159.

Coibion, Olivier, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Lorenz Kueng, and John Silvia. 2017. "Innocent Bystanders? Monetary policy and inequality." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 88: 70–89.

Constantinides, George M., and Darrell Duffie. 1996. "Asset pricing with heterogeneous consumers." *Journal of Political Economy* 104(2): 219–240.

Crook, Jonathan. 2001. "The demand for household debt in the USA: evidence from the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finance." *Applied Financial Economics* 11(1): 83–91.

Crook, Jonathan. 2006. "Household debt demand and supply: A cross-country comparison." In *The Economics of Consumer Credit.* , ed. Giuseppe Bertola, Richard Disney and Charles Grant, 63–92. MA:Mit Press Cambridge.

Debortoli, Davide, and Jordi Galí. 2017. "Monetary policy with heterogeneous agents: Insights from TANK models." *manuscript.*

Doepke, Matthias, and Martin Schneider. 2006. "Inflation and the redistribution of nominal wealth." *Journal of Political Economy* 114(6): 1069–1097.

Dolado, Juan, Gergo Motyovszki, and Evi Pappa. 2018. "Monetary policy and inequality under labor market frictions and capital-skill complementarity." *Manuscript.*

Dupor, Bill, Jing Han, and Yi-Chan Tsai. 2009. "What do technology shocks tell us about the New Keynesian paradigm?" *Journal of Monetary Economics* 56(4): 560–569.

Dynan, Karen E., Jonathan Skinner, and Stephen P. Zeldes. 2004. "Do the rich save more?" *Journal of Political Economy* 112(2): 397–444.

Fernald, John. 2014. "A quarterly, utilization-adjusted series on total factor productivity." Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2012–19.

Frank, Mark, Estelle Sommeiller, Mark Price, and Emmanuel Saez. 2015. "Frank-Sommeiller-Price series for top income shares by US states since 1917." *WTID Methodological Notes.*

Galí, Jordi. 2015. *Monetary policy, inflation, and the business cycle: an introduction to the new Keynesian framework and its applications.* Princeton University Press.

Galí, Jordi, J. David López-Salido, and Javier Vallés. 2004. "Rule-of-Thumb Consumers and the Design of Interest Rate Rules." *Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking* 36(4): 739–763.

Galí, Jordi, J. David López-Salido, and Javier Vallés. 2007. "Understanding the effects of government spending on consumption." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 5(1): 227–270.

Gilchrist, Simon, and Egon Zakrajšek. 2012. "Credit spreads and business cycle fluctuations." *American Economic Review* 102(4): 1692–1720.

Goldin, Claudia Dale, and Lawrence F. Katz. 2009. *The Race between Education and Technology.* Harvard University Press.

Gornemann, Nils, Keith Kuester, and Makoto Nakajima. 2016. "Doves for the rich, hawks for the poor? Distributional consequences of monetary policy." *Manuscript.*

Gorodnichenko, Yuriy, and Byoungchan Lee. 2017. "A Note on Variance Decomposition with Local Projections." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 23998.

Guerrieri, Veronica, and Guido Lorenzoni. 2017. "Credit crises, precautionary savings, and the liquidity trap." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 132(3): 1427–1467.

Guiso, Luigi, and Paolo Sodini. 2013. "Household finance: An emerging field." In *Handbook of the Economics of Finance.* Vol. 2, 1397–1532. Elsevier.

Guvenen, Fatih, Fatih Karahan, Serdar Ozkan, and Jae Song. 2015. "What do data on millions of US workers reveal about life-cycle earnings risk?" National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 20913.

Guvenen, Fatih, Sam Schulhofer-Wohl, Jae Song, and Motohiro Yogo. 2017. "Worker betas: Five facts about systematic earnings risk." *American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings* 107(5): 398–403.

Guvenen, Fatih, Serdar Ozkan, and Jae Song. 2014. "The nature of countercyclical income risk." *Journal of Political Economy* 122(3): 621–660.

Heer, Burkhard, and Christian Scharrer. 2016. "The Burden of Unanticipated Government Spending." CESifo Working Paper 5876.

Herbst, Edward P, and Frank Schorfheide. 2015. *Bayesian estimation of DSGE models.* Princeton University Press.

Johnson, David S., Jonathan A. Parker, and Nicholas S. Souleles. 2006. "Household expenditure and the income tax rebates of 2001." *American Economic Review* 96(5): 1589–1610.

Jordà, Òscar. 2005. "Estimation and inference of impulse responses by local projections." *American Economic Review* 95(1): 161–182.

Jurado, Kyle, Sydney C. Ludvigson, and Serena Ng. 2015. "Measuring uncertainty." *American Economic Review* 105(3): 1177–1216.

Justiniano, Alejandro, Giorgio E. Primiceri, and Andrea Tambalotti. 2010. "Investment shocks and business cycles." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 57(2): 132–145.

Justiniano, Alejandro, Giorgio E. Primiceri, and Andrea Tambalotti. 2011. "Investment shocks and the relative price of investment." *Review of Economic Dynamics* 14(1): 102–121.

Kaplan, Greg, and Giovanni L. Violante. 2014. "A model of the consumption response to fiscal stimulus payments." *Econometrica* 82(4): 1199–1239.

Kaplan, Greg, and Giovanni L. Violante. 2018. "Microeconomic Heterogeneity and Macroeconomic Shocks." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 32(3): 167–194.

Kaplan, Greg, Benjamin Moll, and Giovanni L. Violante. 2018. "Monetary policy according to HANK." *American Economic Review* 108(3): 697–743.

Kaplan, Greg, Giovanni L. Violante, and Justin Weidner. 2014. "The wealthy hand-to-mouth." *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* 1: 77–138.

Kilian, Lutz. 2008. "Exogenous oil supply shocks: how big are they and how much do they matter for the US economy?" *Review of Economics and Statistics* 90(2): 216–240.

Kilian, Lutz. 2009. "Not all oil price shocks are alike: Disentangling demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market." *American Economic Review* 99(3): 1053–69.

Kim, Jae-Young. 2002. "Limited information likelihood and Bayesian analysis." *Journal of Econometrics* 107(1-2): 175–193.

Koop, Gary, M. Hashem Pesaran, and Simon M. Potter. 1996. "Impulse response analysis in nonlinear multivariate models." *Journal of Econometrics* 74(1): 119–147.

Krueger, Dirk, Kurt Mitman, and Fabrizio Perri. 2016. "Macroeconomics and household heterogeneity." In *Handbook of Macroeconomics.* Vol. 2, 843–921. Elsevier.

Krusell, Per, Lee E. Ohanian, José-Víctor Ríos-Rull, and Giovanni L. Violante. 2000. "Capital-skill complementarity and inequality: A macroeconomic analysis." *Econometrica* 68(5): 1029–1053.

Kuhn, Moritz, and José-Victor Rios-Rull. 2016. "2013 Update on the US earnings, income, and wealth distributional facts: A View from Macroeconomics." *Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review* 37(1): 1–75.

Kumhof, Michael, Romain Rancière, and Pablo Winant. 2015. "Inequality, leverage, and crises." *American Economic Review* 105(3): 1217–45.

Kwiatkowski, Denis, Peter C.B. Phillips, Peter Schmidt, and Yongcheol Shin. 1992. "Testing the null hypothesis of stationarity against the alternative of a unit root: How sure are we that economic time series have a unit root?" *Journal of Econometrics* 54(1-3): 159–178.

Lorenzoni, Guido. 2009. "A theory of demand shocks." *American Economic Review* 99(5): 2050–84.

McKay, Alisdair, and Ricardo Reis. 2016. "The role of automatic stabilizers in the US business cycle." *Econometrica* 84(1): 141–194.

McKay, Alisdair, Emi Nakamura, and Jón Steinsson. 2016. "The power of forward guidance revisited." *American Economic Review* 106(10): 3133–58.

McKay, Alisdair, Emi Nakamura, and Jón Steinsson. 2017. "The discounted euler equation: A note." *Economica* 84(336): 820–831.

Mian, Atif, and Amir Sufi. 2015. *House of debt: How they (and you) caused the Great Recession, and how we can prevent it from happening again.* University of Chicago Press.

Mian, Atif, Kamalesh Rao, and Amir Sufi. 2013. "Household balance sheets, consumption, and the economic slump." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 128(4): 1687–1726.

Nakamura, Emi, and Jon Steinsson. 2014. "Fiscal stimulus in a monetary union: Evidence from US regions." *American Economic Review* 104(3): 753–92.

Pagan, Adrian. 1984. "Econometric issues in the analysis of regressions with generated regressors." *International Economic Review* 25(1): 221–247.

Parker, Jonathan A., and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen. 2009. "Who bears aggregate fluctuations and how?" *American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings* 99(2): 399–405.

Parker, Jonathan A., Nicholas S. Souleles, David S. Johnson, and Robert McClelland. 2013. "Consumer spending and the economic stimulus payments of 2008." *American Economic Review* 103(6): 2530–53.

Pencavel, John H. 1984. "The tradeoff between wages and employment in trade union objectives." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 99(2): 215–231.

Phaneuf, Louis, Eric Sims, and Jean Gardy Victor. 2018. "Inflation, output and markup dynamics with purely forward-looking wage and price setters." *European Economic Review* 105: 115–134.

Phillips, Peter C.B., and Pierre Perron. 1988. "Testing for a unit root in time series regression." *Biometrika* 75(2): 335–346.

Piketty, Thomas, and Emmanuel Saez. 2003. "Income inequality in the United States, 1913–1998." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 118(1): 1–41.

Ragot, Xavier. 2018. "Heterogeneous agents in the macroeconomy: reduced-heterogeneity representations." In *Handbook of Computational Economics.* Vol. 4, 215–253. Elsevier.

Ramey, Valerie A., and Sarah Zubairy. 2018. "Government spending multipliers in good times and in bad: evidence from US historical data." *Journal of Political Economy* 126(2): 850–901.

Ravn, Morten O., and Vincent Sterk. 2017. "Job uncertainty and deep recessions." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 90: 125–141.

Ravn, Morten O., and Vincent Sterk. 2018. "Macroeconomic fluctuations with HANK & SAM: An analytical approach." *Manuscript.*

Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer. 1999. "Monetary Policy and the Well-Being of the Poor." *Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review* 84(1): 21–49.

Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer. 2004. "A new measure of monetary shocks: Derivation and implications." *American Economic Review* 94(4): 1055–1084.

Rotemberg, Julio J. 1982. "Sticky prices in the United States." *Journal of Political Economy* 90(6): 1187–1211.

Rotemberg, Julio J., and Michael Woodford. 1997. "An optimization-based econometric framework for the evaluation of monetary policy." *NBER Macroeconomics Annual* 12: 297–346.

Rothschild, Michael, and Joseph E Stiglitz. 1970. "Increasing risk: I. A definition." *Journal of Economic Theory* 2(3): 225–243.

Rothschild, Michael, and Joseph E Stiglitz. 1971. "Increasing risk: II. Its economic consequences." *Journal of Economic Theory* 3(1): 66–84.

Saez, Emmanuel, and Gabriel Zucman. 2016. "Wealth inequality in the United States since 1913: Evidence from capitalized income tax data." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 131(2): 519–578.

Smets, Frank, and Rafael Wouters. 2007. "Shocks and frictions in US business cycles: A Bayesian DSGE approach." *American Economic Review* 97(3): 586–606.

Song, Jae, David J. Price, Fatih Guvenen, Nicholas Bloom, and Till Von Wachter. 2018. "Firming up inequality." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 134(1): 1–50.

Storesletten, Kjetil, Chris I. Telmer, and Amir Yaron. 2004. "Cyclical dynamics in idiosyncratic labor market risk." *Journal of Political Economy* 112(3): 695–717.

Straub, Ludwig. 2018. "Consumption, Savings, and the Distribution of Permanent Income." *Manuscript.*

Werning, Iván. 2015. "Incomplete markets and aggregate demand." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 21448.

Wolff, Edward N. 2017. "Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962 to 2016: Has Middle Class Wealth Recovered?" National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 24085.

Woodford, Michael. 2003. *Interest and prices: Foundations of a theory of monetary policy.* Princeton University Press.

Yellen, Janet L. 2016. "Macroeconomic research after the crisis." *Speech given at the 60th Annual Economic Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,* Boston, October 14.

Zidar, Owen M. 2018. "Tax cuts for whom? Heterogeneous effects of income tax changes on growth and employment." *Journal of Political Economy,* forthcoming.

Table 1: Summary statistics.

	1975:Q1	1984:Q1	2001:Q1	2014:Q1
Industrial classification	SIC 2-digit	SIC 4-digit	NAICS 6-digit	NAICS 6-digit
Number of cells	105,026	219,300	265,805	268,875
Total number of workers, million	59.9	64.8	89.0	96.3
Total earnings, USD billion	145.5	297.6	846.4	1,303.4
Average earnings, USD	2,430	4,590	9,514	13,540
Distribution of the number of workers in a cell				
P1	1	1	1	1
P25	24	18	23	23
P50	78	51	64	66
P75	280	167	207	214
P99	8,750	4,109	4,543	4,948

Notes: A cell means an industry/county/ownership-type combination in the QCEW. In the data, the number of workers is counted in each month, while the earnings are available only quarterly. Thus, I use the average number of workers over three months in each cell, which may not be an integer. The fractional parts are rounded in the table. For example, there are about 66 workers in a median-sized cell in the first quarter of 2014.

Table 2: Model parameters.

Parameter	Value	Description, Source, and Comment
β	0.99	Time preference. In the SS, $1/\beta = 1 - \delta + \delta(1-\alpha)/(\phi_I \mathcal{M}_P)$.
γ^K	8.39^e	Negative elasticity of u_C^K at the SS
b^K	0	Consumption habits for the Keynesian, Pre-MCMC numerical optimization gives 0.
γ^R	2	Negative elasticity of u_C^R at the SS
b^R	0.7	Consumption habits for the Ricardian
γ^L	2	Negative elasticity of u_e^L at the SS
b^L	0.7	Earnings habits for the labor unions
$\bar{u}_C^K/\bar{u}_C^R$	3.99^e	Ratio of the marginal consumption utilities at the SS
$\bar{s}^K$	0.2	Population share of the Keynesian family at the SS, Debortoli and Galí (2017).
$\bar{s}_C^K$	0.11	Consumption share of the Keynesian family at the SS, Krueger, Mitman and Perri (2016).
$\bar{s}_N^K$	0.08	Labor share of the Keynesian family at the SS, Kuhn and Rios-Rull (2016).
q^{RK}	0.0025	Transition probability from the Ricardian to the Keynesian family, see Section 5.2.2.
η_Y	4.32^e	Negative elasticity of q_t^{KK} to Y_t
η_s	0.51^e	Negative elasticity of q_t^{KK} to s_{t-1}^K
φ	1/0.54	Elasticity of labor disutility v^L at the SS. Chetty et al. (2011).
δ	0.025	Capital depreciation rate
α	2/3	Production function: $Y = AK^{1-\alpha}N^{\alpha}$.
$\Phi_{\nu\nu}^{\nu}(\bar{\nu})$	0.23^e	Second derivative of the capital utilization costs at the SS. $\Phi_{\nu}^{\nu}(\bar{\nu}) = 0.035$ is chosen to make $\bar{\nu} = 1$.
$\Phi_{II}^{I}(1)$	1.64^e	Second derivative of the investment adjustment costs at the SS

Continued on the next page.

Notes: e: estimated, SS: steady state.

Table 2: Model parameters, continued.

Parameter	Value	Description, Source, and Comment
$\mathcal{M}_P$	1.2	Gross price markup at the SS, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). Equivalent to $\epsilon_P = 6$.
ψ_P	233.3	Price adjustment costs. Equivalent to the Calvo probability of 0.75.
$\mathcal{M}_W$	1.2	Gross wage markup at the SS, Huang and Liu (2002), Griffin (1992). Equivalent to $\epsilon_W = 6$.
ψ_W	706.3	Wage adjustment costs. Equivalent to the Calvo probability of 0.75.
ϕ_C	0.6	$\bar{C}/\bar{Y}$.
ϕ_I	0.2	$\bar{I}/\bar{Y}$. $\phi_G \equiv \bar{G}/\bar{Y} = 0.2$.
ρ_i	0.9	Monetary policy: interest rate smoothing
ζ_π	2	Monetary policy: responsiveness to price inflation
ζ_Y	0.15	Monetary policy: responsiveness to output
ρ_Z	0.77^e	Persistence of inequality shocks
ρ_A	0.77^e	Persistence of productivity shocks
ρ_G	0.97	Persistence of government expenditure shocks, Smets and Wouters (2007).
σ_Z	0.0030^e	Standard deviation of inequality shocks
σ_i	0.0008^e	Standard deviation of monetary policy shocks
σ_A	0.0101^e	Standard deviation of productivity shocks
σ_G	0.0050	Standard deviation of government expenditure shocks, Smets and Wouters (2007).

Notes: e: estimated, SS: steady state.

Table 3: Parameter estimation, the benchmark case.

	Prior			Posterior			
Parameter	Distribution	Mean	St. Dev.	Mode	Mean	P5	P95
$\gamma^K - 1$	Gamma	10	5	7.39	7.22	6.98	7.49
$\Phi^{\nu}_{\nu\nu}(\bar{\nu})$	Gamma	0.1	0.05	0.23	0.18	0.15	0.24
$\Phi^{I}_{II}(1)$	Gamma	3	1	1.64	1.74	1.61	1.86
$\bar{u}^K_C/\bar{u}^R_C - 1$	Gamma	1	1	2.99	3.25	2.93	3.60
η_Y	Gamma	3	1.5	4.32	4.07	3.79	4.37
$\eta_s + 1$	Gamma	1.5	0.5	1.51	1.52	1.51	1.53
ρ_Z	Beta	0.8	0.05	0.770	0.777	0.763	0.789
ρ_A	Beta	0.9	0.05	0.772	0.800	0.767	0.818
σ_Z	Inv. Gam.	0.0025	0.0010	0.0030	0.0030	0.0028	0.0032
σ_i	Inv. Gam.	0.0013	0.0003	0.0008	0.0009	0.0008	0.0009
σ_A	Inv. Gam.	0.0081	0.0016	0.0101	0.0097	0.0088	0.0112

Notes: The supports of priors are not $(-\infty, \infty)$. For a gamma or an inverse gamma distribution, the support is $(0, \infty)$, and a beta distribution is defined on $(0, 1)$. This might incur problems near the boundary when a random walk algorithm suggests a value outside the support. Thus, I re-parameterize Θ. For a beta random variable, I use $f(x) = \tan(\pi x - \pi/2)$, and $\log(\cdot)$ function is employed for the others. I write the transformation as $\tilde{\Theta} = F(\Theta)$. I work with $\tilde{\Theta}$ throughout the estimation and inverse the chained samples to Θ at the last step. I simulate a Markov chain whose length is 200,000, and the first 50,000 observations are dropped. The acceptance rate is 34%.

Table 4: Parameter estimation, robustness check.

Parameter	All shocks	Inequality shock	Monetary shock	TFP shock	High $\bar{s}_C^K$ and $\bar{s}_N^K$
γ^K	8.39 (0.15)	6.14 (0.44)	8.14 (0.53)	13.28 (1.35)	7.11 (0.88)
$\Phi_{\nu\nu}^{\nu}(\bar{\nu})$	0.23 (0.027)	0.06 (0.004)	0.05 (0.013)	0.19 (0.010)	0.17 (0.003)
$\Phi_{II}^{I}(1)$	1.64 (0.08)	1.69 (0.07)	1.89 (0.19)	2.25 (0.25)	2.23 (0.13)
$\bar{u}_C^K/\bar{u}_C^R$	3.99 (0.18)	4.90 (0.19)	3.82 (0.21)	1.75 (0.24)	2.01 (0.10)
η_Y	4.32 (0.17)	4.86 (0.26)	5.55 (0.37)	4.67 (0.13)	4.57 (0.17)
η_s	0.51 (0.01)	0.82 (0.04)	0.58 (0.02)	0.39 (0.03)	0.38 (0.02)
ρ_Z	0.77 (0.007)	0.78 (0.005)	-	-	0.79 (0.009)
ρ_A	0.77 (0.016)	-	-	0.85 (0.006)	0.87 (0.004)
σ_Z	0.0030 (0.0001)	0.0021 (0.0002)	-	-	0.0061 (0.0007)
σ_i	0.0008 (0.00001)	-	0.0008 (0.00002)	-	0.0009 (0.00002)
σ_A	0.0101 (0.0007)	-	-	0.0069 (0.0002)	0.0061 (0.0002)
Log Posterior	-70.0	-234.6	-134.6	-132.3	-88.0

Notes: This table displays the posterior mode with the standard deviation in parentheses. The column labeled as all shocks is based on the benchmark results in Table 3. The next three columns are for restricted moment conditions. For example, the estimates in the inequality shock column are obtained by matching responses to a one standard deviation inequality shock only. The last column is for a case where $\bar{s}_C^K = 0.15$ and $\bar{s}_N^K = 0.12$ in view of the wealthy hand-to-mouth agents. The benchmark values are 0.11 and 0.08, respectively, which are based on the bottom 20 percent of the wealth distribution in the U.S. I report the value of log posterior based on the posterior distribution in the benchmark case for comparison. For parameters not estimated, *e.g.,* ρ_A in the inequality shock column, I use the prior mean in Table 3 when evaluating the log posterior at the mode.

Table 5: Responses of state real GDP per capita to government spending shocks conditional on inequality.

	h				
	0	1	2	3	4
β_h	2.48	-10.24**	-22.40***	-21.12**	-26.78
	(6.54)	(4.41)	(7.80)	(8.46)	(12.09)
γ_h	-5.78	33.31***	68.58***	67.06***	83.43
	(18.48)	(12.51)	(21.92)	(24.14)	(33.67)
Observations	1,746	1,740	1,734	1,684	1,634
$\beta_h + \gamma_h \cdot 0.3$	0.74	-0.25	-1.83	-1.00	-1.75
$\beta_h + \gamma_h \cdot 0.4$	0.16	3.08***	5.03***	5.70***	6.59**
$\beta_h + \gamma_h \cdot 0.5$	-0.41	6.41**	11.89***	12.41***	14.93**

Notes: This table is based on Equation (35). As is clear from the bottom half of the table, the response of real state GDP to state fiscal expenditure shocks depends on the state top 10% income shares significantly. Standard errors are in parentheses, which are clustered by state. The number of asterisks denotes statistical significance of the estimate. *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%.



Figure 1: New inequality index and log percentiles.

Notes: The left panel depicts my new inequality index in comparison with the CPS-based measure, where the log percentiles of the real earnings distribution from the QCEW are shown in the right panel. Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008) construct the log P90/P10 index from the March annual demographic survey in the CPS. They focus on male respondents and derive weakly earnings from annual earnings and number of working weeks. On the other hand, the QCEW covers both male and female workers. Each percentile is deflated using the GDP implicit deflator.



Figure 2: Effects of structural shocks on the inequality index and aggregate real earnings.

Notes: The solid lines and the shaded area represent how the inequality index responds to a one standard deviation TFP, MP, and FP shock with the 90% confidence bands. The dash-dot lines and the dotted lines are for aggregate real earnings from the QCEW. Units are annualized percent and annualized log points. The bandwidth for the Newey-West variance estimator increases in the horizon of local projections one for one. For the inequality index, the Phillips-Perron test does not reject the null of a unit root, while the KPSS test rejects the null of trend-stationarity at the 1 percent level (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992; Phillips and Perron, 1988). On the other hand, both tests do not reject own nulls for aggregate earnings. I assume a trend-stationary model in this case and include $d_h t$ term and use y_{t-i} in place of Δy_{t-i} in Equation (2). The benchmark result is not sensitive to the specification details. The results based on other inequality measures, specifications controlling for the early Volcker period, a model with an oil supply shock of Kilian (2008), or the impulse response functions estimated in a shock by shock manner can be found in Appendix B.3.



Figure 3: Decomposing the responses of the inequality index.

Notes: The solid lines and the shaded area represent how the log P50/P10 index, which represents the dispersion among the bottom half of earnings distribution, responds to a one standard TFP, MP, and FP shock. The dash-dot lines and the dotted lines are for the log P90/P50 index. The results are similar when a dummy variable for the early Volcker period is added or sample after the period is used (see Appendix B.4). I use Equation (2) and assume that both series have a unit root based on the results of the Phillips-Perron test and the KPSS test (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992; Phillips and Perron, 1988).



Figure 4: Variance decomposition of the inequality index.

Notes: The solid lines denote the estimated forecast error variance decompositions (FEVD) based on the benchmark sample with the shaded area being the bootstrapped 90 percent confidence bands. The benchmark sample spans from 1978:Q1 to 2008:Q4. The other sample begins in 1983:Q1 after the early Volcker period when the Fed targeted the amount of non-borrowed reserves. The results using the second sample are represented by the dash-dot and the dotted lines. I use the bias-corrected R^2 estimator of Gorodnichenko and Lee (2017) to estimate the FEVDs. Other lag length, the inclusion of the oil supply shocks of either Kilian (2008) or Kilian (2009), and considering a smaller information set by letting an information set contain only one shock each time do not change the results significantly (see Appendix B.6).



Figure 5: Identified unanticipated innovations in earnings inequality.

Notes: This figure plots the unanticipated innovations in earnings inequality ($x_{t,ineq}$) in Equation (4). The units are annualized log points. The grey bars depict when major tax reforms in the U.S. were signed into laws with the name of president who signed: (i) the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA 81), Ronald Reagan, August 13, 1981, (ii) the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86), Ronald Reagan, October 22, 1986, (iii) the Omnibus Budeget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 93), Bill Clinton, August 10, 1993, and (iv) the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA 03), George W. Bush, May 28, 2003. The OBRA 93 raised the top marginal income tax rates while the others did the opposite. Considering the dates when the new tax rates became effective for the first time does not change the implication from the figure. The first tax cut following the ERTA 81 happened on October 1, 1981, and $x_{t,ineq}$ is positive in 1981:Q4. The income tax rates defined on the TRA 86 were applicable from the tax year 1987, and similarly the identified shock in 1987:Q1 is positive. The new rates from the OBRA 93 were applied since the tax year 1993. Because it was signed in the middle of 1993:Q3, it is natural that 1993:Q4 is the first quarter under the new tax rates. And the identified shock is negative in 1993:Q4. Similarly, the tax rates from the JGTRRA 03 were valid for the tax year 2003 and it was signed in the middle of 2003:Q2. Consistently, the identified shock in 2003:Q3 is positive.



Figure 6: Responses of macroeconomic variables to an inequality shock.

Notes: The impulse responses are estimated by local projections in Equation (5). The dotted lines denote the 90 percent confidence bands where the bandwidth for the Newey-West variance estimator increases in the horizon of local projections one for one. All responses are either in annualized percent, annualized percentage points, or annualized log points. The bottom right panel illustrates the response of the log P90/P10 index. The results here are robust to various specification details (see Appendix C.2).



Figure 7: FEVDs, unanticipated innovations in inequality.

Notes: I employ the bias-corrected R^2 estimator of Gorodnichenko and Lee (2017) to estimate the forecast error variance decompositions, where the unanticipated innovations in inequality is from Section 4.2. The bias-correction uses bootstrapped samples from a vector autoregression model for variables in $\mathbf{Z}_t^{(m)}$ and the inequality shock. The 90 percent bootstrapped confidence bands are denoted by the dotted lines. The results are robust to specification details (see Appendix C.3).



Figure 8: Matching impulse response functions.

Notes: The empirical impulse response functions and the confidence bands are from Figure 6. The model is evaluated at the posterior mode and the corresponding impulse response functions are illustrated by the solid lines with diamonds. For the calibrated parameters and the posterior mode, see Table 2 and 3. The peak effects of both the empirical and model responses are similar. Furthermore, the model responses are in the 90 percent confidence bands at most lags. While this is not the case for small h's, I include the moment conditions related to the inequality shocks only for $4 \leq h \leq 12$ when evaluating the posterior. This is because the empirical responses for the variables other than the inequality index at $h = 0$ are zero by construction, and this obviously affects estimates for small h's too.



Figure 9: Decomposition of aggregate consumption responses.

Notes: The dotted line represents $E_t\left[\bar{s}_C^K \check{C}_{t+\tau}^K\right]$, the direct effect of a one standard deviation inequality shock to the Keynesians' consumption. The dash-dot line is for $E_t\left[\bar{s}_C^R \check{C}_{t+\tau}^R\right]$, the direct effect to the Ricardians' consumption. The distributional effect, $E_t\left[\left(\bar{s}_C^K - \frac{\bar{s}^K}{\bar{s}^R}\bar{s}_C^R\right)\check{s}_{t+\tau}^K\right]$, is illustrated by the dashed line. The total aggregate consumption response, $E_t\left[\check{C}_{t+\tau}\right]$, is shown by the red solid line with diamonds. The units are annualized percent obtained by multiplying 400 to the model outcome. The left panel is based on the benchmark parameter estimates, while the right panel is based on the posterior mode when $\bar{s}_C^K$ and $\bar{s}_N^K$ are calibrated at 0.15 and 0.12, respectively.



Figure 10: Responses of consumption conditional on the level of inequality, model.

Notes: The generalized impulse responses are based on the third order pruned state-space system in Andreasen, Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2017). In the high inequality state, $s^K_{t-1} = 0.25$ and all the other variables equal their steady-state values. The low inequality state is based on $s^K_{t-1} = 0.15$. Inputs are one standard deviation contractionary monetary policy shocks and expansionary fiscal policy shocks. The units are annualized percent. The results for other variables are in Appendix E.3.



Figure 11: Responses of consumption conditional on the level of inequality, recent data.

Notes: Two panels depict the impulse responses of consumption given a one standard deviation contractionary monetary policy shock and an expansionary fiscal policy shock, respectively. Each panel plots two sets of results: the impulse responses conditional on the inequality index being one standard deviation below or above the mean, 1.38 and 1.64, respectively. The results are based on Equation (34), a local projection with an interaction term between the lagged inequality index and a shock. The bandwidth for the Newey-West variance estimator increases in the horizon of local projections one for one. For responses of other macroeconomic variables and the results based on total factor productivity shocks, see Appendix E.1.



Figure 12: Responses of real GDP conditional on the level of inequality, historical data.

Notes: The results in this figure is based on the long historical data of Piketty and Saez (2003) and Ramey and Zubairy (2018). The top 10% income share series of Piketty and Saez is annual, and therefore the unit for the horizontal axis is a year. The sample period is from 1917 to 2015. The top 10% income share displays a U-shaped pattern during the sample periods. The results are based on Equation (34), where the bandwidth for the Newey-West variance estimator increases in the horizon of local projections one for one. The input is a military news shock whose present discounted value amounts to 10 percent of the trend GDP. The result for the GDP deflator and unemployment rate, and further robustness checks are in Appendix E.2.