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Seminars

Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects

Date: Tuesday, Nov 21, 2017, 15:30 ~ 16:30
Speaker: Yan Long(New York University Abu Dhabi)
Location: 16동 655호
BK21플러스, 분배정의센터 공동 개최 Seminar

Abstract
 Strategy-proof, budget-balanced, and envy-free rank mechanisms assign q identical objects to n agents. The efficiency loss is the largest ratio of surplus loss to efficient surplus, over all profiles of non-zero valuations. The smallest efficiency loss (n−q)/(n^2−n) is uniquely achieved by the following simple allocation rule: assign one object to each of the q − 1 agents with the highest valuations, a large probability to the agent with the qth highest valuation, and the remaining probability to the agent with the (q + 1)th highest valuation.

* 본 세미나는 BK21플러스관련 세미나 참석으로 인정되는 행사입니다.


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