Seminars

◈ 주   관 : 경제학부, 경제연구소 한국경제혁신센터, SSK, BK21

- 본 세미나는 경제학부 BK21 관련 세미나 참석으로 인정됩니다.
 경제학부 대학원생 중 세미나 참석 인정을 받기를 원하시는 학생은 세미나 종료 후 세미나실 내에 위치한 참석 명단을 기재해 주시기 바랍니다.

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Abstract

We study how endogenous wage disclosure within households shapes labor supply, household production, and welfare. Using Japanese survey data that record spousal earnings disclosure, we document systematic allocation differences across disclosure regimes: non-disclosure is associated with wives' longer market hours, less home production, and lower household public-good expenditure. We develop and estimate a two-stage model in which spouses choose whether to disclose wages before allocating time and resources in a noncooperative public-goods game. Non-disclosure exposes the partner to a selection-distorted posterior, creating information rents when realized wages are high. For high-earning wives, this strategic motive is reinforced by gender-specific disclosure costs; for high-earning husbands, disclosure preferences work in the opposite direction. Counterfactual full disclosure leaves public-good expenditure nearly unchanged but reallocates work, consumption, and welfare shares.