Milestones and Feedback in Dynamic Voluntary Contribution Games
Abstract:The provision of public goods often involves dynamic contributions over time. In this process, information provision can be structured in different ways to resolve the strategic uncertainty that decision makers face. We examine whether providing real-time feedback about progress or feedback based on the achievement of pre-determined intermediate goals (i.e., milestones) is more beneficial for increasing dynamic contributions to a public good. An important application is in fund-raising campaigns, where both types of feedback structures have been considered. Our results reveal that providing feedback about the attainment of milestones leads to a significant increase in average group contributions as compared to real-time feedback. This impact is largely driven by conditional cooperators. The magnitude of the milestones does not seem to make a difference. Findings from a follow-up experiment reveal evidence of a goal effect, a signaling effect, and an information effect arising from the use of milestones on the behavior of conditional co-operators.