Seminars

Abstract: Traditional economic theories assume that money is fungible – in that income from one source is the same as from another. However, previous research has suggested that people tend to feel much more deserving — and, consequently, are much less likely to redistribute — incomes earned through efforts or merits. In this study, we hypothesize that transparency around others’ veiled performances, either through merits or luck, will moderate people’s feelings of deservingness of their incomes. Participants (N=1,986) were recruited to play in a novel, winner-takes-all game in which (i) each player in a pair can contribute towards success in a joint production task, but only one person who completes the ‘last piece of the jigsaw’ wins, and (ii) luck plays a significant role in determining each participant’s opportunity to contribute, i.e., individuals can win with minimal contribution. In this setting, we find strong evidence of justified deservingness among winners. The more winners contribute relative to the nonwinners in the production phase, the less they redistribute to the nonwinners. However, in treatments where we unveil information about nonwinners’ veiled performance in unreceived opportunities, we find winners’ redistribution positively and statistically significantly correlated with nonwinners’ performance even if such performance is irrelevant to the joint task’s success. Our results suggest that behind the veiled information about the nonwinners’ performance contains a signal that can effectively alter redistributive preferences — through increased feelings of deservingness of others — even when people feel fully deserving of their income.


※ 본 세미나는 VEAEBES(Virtual East Asia Experimental and Behavioral Economics Seminar Series) 주최로 열리는 세미나 입니다.

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