Seminars

Abstract: In dynamic strategic interactions, a player who might be able to spy on the opponent’s actions might have incentives to feign ignorance and forgo immediate payoffs, so that he can earn higher future payoffs by manipulating the opponent’s suspicion. I model and experimentally implement this situation as a two-stage hide-and-seek game. About half of the informed experimental subjects fail to feign ignorance, and only some learn to through experience, a finding best explained by level-k thinking. The subjects who might be spied on underestimate the chance of spying upon observing ignorant behavior, yet mostly best respond to the opponents’ empirical behavior.

* 본 세미나는 VEAEBES(Virtual East Asia Experimental and Behavioral Economics Seminar series) 주최로 열리는 세미나입니다.

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