An experiment on the Nash program: Comparing two mechanisms implementing the Shapley value
Date: Wednesday, Mar 10, 2021, 14:30 ~ 16:00
Speaker: Nobuyuki HANAKI (Osaka University)
Location: Zoom을 통한 온라인세미나
Abstract: We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-based Winter's demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell bidding procedure. Our results suggest that, on the one hand, the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell mechanism better induces players to cooperate and to agree on an efficient outcome; on the other hand, the demand-based Winter mechanism better implements allocations that reflect players' effective bargaining power.
* 본 세미나는 VEAEBES(Virtual East Asia Experimental and Behavioral Economics Seminar series) 주최로 열리는 세미나입니다.
참여신청은 아래의 링크로 해주시길 바랍니다.
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* 본 세미나는 VEAEBES(Virtual East Asia Experimental and Behavioral Economics Seminar series) 주최로 열리는 세미나입니다.
참여신청은 아래의 링크로 해주시길 바랍니다.
link
이후 이메일로 zoom링크가 발송됩니다.
감사합니다
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