Seminars

Abstract :  Applying Olson's argument to intergroup competition, larger groups may lose against smaller groups even though the larger groups have more resources to compete. However, the occurrence of the group size paradox depends on the type of competition between groups. We model the type of competition using different contest success functions and compare lottery-type and auction-type contests, both theoretically and experimentally. Since there is no purely strategic equilibrium for continuous variable auction-type contests, we numerically derive a quantal response equilibrium that accounts for errors in people's behavior. We find that the group size paradox is less likely to occur in auction-type contests than in lottery-type contests. Experimental evidence supports this prediction.

* 본 세미나는 VEAEBES(Virtual East Asia Experimental and Behavioral Economics Seminar series) 주최로 열리는 세미나입니다.

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