Representation, Peer Pressure, and Punishment in a Public Goods Game Experiment
Date: Wednesday, Sep 8, 2021, 14:30 ~ 16:00
Speaker: Doruk IRIS (Sogang University)
Location: Zoom을 통한 온라인세미나
Abstract: The possibility of costly punishing others has proved to be one of the best institutions for sustaining high levels of cooperation in public goods games. In many public goods dilemma contexts such as environmental protection, international security, pandemic diseases, and team production, decisions are usually delegated to a representative. Using an otherwise standard repeated linear public goods game, we investigate how delegation and punishment affect provision. Specifically, we ask:
• does representative behavior differ from that of self-representing individuals in terms of contributions to the public good and punishment of others?
• What is the impact of non-binding peer pressure (in the form of payoff-immaterial messages from the constituency to their representative) on the representatives’ public good contributions and punishment decisions?
In our experimental design in which team members have common payoff and information, the prediction of a standard model assuming rational and self-interested players is for the behavior of individual and representative, with or without messages, not to differ. However, our results show start differences in the behavior. As a result, we recommend caution about introducing sanctioning institutions to supply global public goods. If the representative behavior is assumed to be the same as the individual behavior, then the level of contributions would be overestimated and the level of punishment would be underestimated. Preference communication with the team could recover some of these detrimental effects.
* 본 세미나는 VEAEBES(Virtual East Asia Experimental and Behavioral Economics Seminar series) 주최로 열리는 세미나입니다.
참여신청은 아래의 링크로 해주시길 바랍니다.
link
이후 이메일로 zoom링크가 발송됩니다.
• does representative behavior differ from that of self-representing individuals in terms of contributions to the public good and punishment of others?
• What is the impact of non-binding peer pressure (in the form of payoff-immaterial messages from the constituency to their representative) on the representatives’ public good contributions and punishment decisions?
In our experimental design in which team members have common payoff and information, the prediction of a standard model assuming rational and self-interested players is for the behavior of individual and representative, with or without messages, not to differ. However, our results show start differences in the behavior. As a result, we recommend caution about introducing sanctioning institutions to supply global public goods. If the representative behavior is assumed to be the same as the individual behavior, then the level of contributions would be overestimated and the level of punishment would be underestimated. Preference communication with the team could recover some of these detrimental effects.
* 본 세미나는 VEAEBES(Virtual East Asia Experimental and Behavioral Economics Seminar series) 주최로 열리는 세미나입니다.
참여신청은 아래의 링크로 해주시길 바랍니다.
link
이후 이메일로 zoom링크가 발송됩니다.