Strategic Sophistication and Collective Action: Theory and Evidence
◈ 주 제 : Strategic Sophistication and Collective Action: Theory and Evidence - joint with Mimi Jeon, Seonghoon Kim, and Kanghyock Koh
◈ 발표자 : 신은철(KAIST)
◈ 일 시 : 2024년 3월 20일 수요일 16:30 ~ 17:45
◈ 장 소 : 우석경제관(223동) 308호
◈ 주 관 : 경제학부, 경제연구소 한국경제혁신센터, SSK, BK21
Strategic Sophistication and Collective Action: Theory and Evidence
Abstract:
This study investigates the effects of individuals' strategic sophistication, measured by level-k type, on collective action in the context of social distancing during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. We build a weakest-link public goods game with the private cost of social distancing, in which agents are heterogeneous in level-k types. We find that players with higher level-k types are more likely to engage in social-distancing behaviors. We test this hypothesis using large-scale nationally representative survey data that measure level-k types through incentivized experiments. Our empirical findings provide consistent evidence for the theoretical prediction, highlighting the importance of understanding the role of level-k theory in real-world collective action problems.
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