The Gendered Effects of Children on Household Relocation
◈ 주 제 : The Gendered Effects of Children on Household Relocation
◈ 발표자 : Jiwon Lee (UNC Chapel Hill)
◈ 일 시 : 2026년 4월 22일 수요일 16:30 ~ 17:45
◈ 장 소 : 16동 338호
◈ 주 관 : 경제학부, 경제연구소 한국경제혁신센터, SSK, BK21
세미나 이전에 연사님과 개인면담을 원하시는 분은 아래 구글 스프레드시트에서 원하시는 시간에 성함을 기입해주시기 바랍니다. 개인면담 스프레드시트는 21일 오후 12시에 마감하도록 하겠습니다.
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1fwKtAIRI2G8B6nq94EOYRHyDE-p_r6tJ57vqmKF_6G4/edit?usp=sharing
- 본 세미나는 경제학부 BK21 관련 세미나 참석으로 인정됩니다.
경제학부 대학원생 중 세미나 참석 인정을 받기를 원하시는 학생은 세미나 종료 후 세미나실 내에 위치한 참석 명단을 기재해 주시기 바랍니다.
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Abstract
This paper studies how fertility and children reshape couples' relocation decisions and their gendered consequences for geographic job mobility, wages, and welfare. Using Australian panel data, I document that before children, both spouses' preferences equally predict long-distance moves; after the first birth, husbands' preferences dominate regardless of relative education and income, and the gender wage gap widens following relocation. To interpret these patterns, I develop a dynamic collective household model with endogenous fertility, joint job search, and bargaining over relocation under limited commitment, in which decision weights respond endogenously to spouses' outside options. The model highlights two mechanisms: children raise the payoff to specialization and weaken the primary caregiver's outside option, tilting decisions toward the male partner's preferences and gains. I validate these mechanisms using a quasi-experimental design based on a 2015 reform to Australia's Family Tax Benefit, which tightened eligibility for single-earner couples for a benefit paid directly to the non-working spouse. Estimates from the model show that fertility is a key margin shaping couples' geographic job mobility and that bargaining frictions induce moves that disproportionately lower women's wages and welfare. Eliminating this friction would not reduce aggregate mobility but would instead reallocate moves to those with more equal gains. Finally, I show that policies ignoring these internal dynamics—such as relocation subsidies—amplify within-household inequality, whereas family policies that strengthen women's bargaining position—such as childcare subsidies—promote more equitable moves without sacrificing mobility.