Affective Polarization and Long-Term Partnership
◈ 주 제 : Affective Polarization and Long-Term Partnership
◈ 발표자 : Jaemin Woo (Brown University)
◈ 일 시 : 2026년 6월 9일 화요일 12:00 ~ 13:15
◈ 장 소 : 223동 309호
◈ 주 관 : 경제학부, 경제연구소 한국경제혁신센터, SSK, BK21
참석을 원하시는 분들은 점심 식수 인원 파악을 위하여 아래 링크를 통해 6월 5일 18시까지 신청해 주시기 바랍니다.
https://forms.gle/EQrBLBucu6tN9Bjr7
- 본 세미나는 경제학부 BK21 관련 세미나 참석으로 인정됩니다.
경제학부 대학원생 중 참석 인정을 받기를 원하시는 학생은 세미나 종료 후 세미나실 내에 위치한 참석 명단을 기재해 주시기 바랍니다.
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Abstract
Three in four couples in the United States today share party identity. Nearly half of adults aged 25 to 45 are unpartnered. We estimate how much of this sorting and singlehood reflects partisan aversion in partner choice. Observed matches confound preferences with availability. To separate them, we run a discrete choice experiment on approximately 1,000 Democrats and Republicans aged 25 to 45 in which party identity, education, and income vary independently across partner profiles. Randomization identifies willingness to pay for partisan alignment, independent of local market composition. Democrats would give up about $210,000 and Republicans about $120,000 in annual partner income to avoid a typical cross-party partner. We embed these preferences in a transferable-utility matching model calibrated to observed population shares and couple-type distributions. Removing partisan aversion while holding composition fixed substantially reduces singlehood and sharply increases the cross-party couple share, with economically meaningful welfare gains in partner-income equivalents. Equalizing partisan composition while holding preferences fixed has much smaller effects, since a modest gender gap in party shares cannot offset large preference penalties on cross-party matches. Republican men and Democratic women gain most from removing aversion because they face the thinnest same-party pools, while their entry into cross-party matches erodes the gains for previously well-matched types.
