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A Field Experiment on Antitrust Compliance

Date: Wednesday, May 22, 2024, 16:30 ~ 17:45
Speaker: Kei Kawai (U of Tokyo)
Location: 우석경제관(223동) 308호

◈ 주   제 : A Field Experiment on Antitrust Compliance
◈ 발표자 : Kei Kawai (U of Tokyo)
◈ 일   시 : 2024년 5월 22일 수요일 16:30 ~ 17:45
◈ 장   소 : 우석경제관(223동) 308호
◈ 주   관 : 경제학부, 경제연구소 한국경제혁신센터, SSK, BK21

A Field Experiment on Antitrust Compliance


We study the effectiveness of firms’ compliance programs by conducting a field
experiment in which we disclose to a subset of Japanese firms that the firm is potentially
engaging in illegal bid-rigging. We find that the information that we disclose affects
the bidding behavior of the treated firms: our test of bid-rigging is less able to reject
the null of competition when applied to the bidding data of the treated firms after
the intervention. We find evidence that this change is not the result of firms ceasing
to collude, however. We find evidence suggesting that firms continue to collude even
after our intervention and that the change in the bidding behavior we document is the
result of active concealment of evidence by cartelizing firms.

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