"Quantal Response Equilibrium with a Continuum of Types: Characterization and Nonparametric Identification", joint with Duarte Goncalves
Date: Friday, Sep 15, 2023, 16:00 ~ 17:30
Speaker: Evan Friedman (Paris School of Economics)
Location: Zoom을 통한 온라인 세미나
Abstract: Quantal response equilibrium (QRE), a statistical generalization of Nash equilibrium, is a standard benchmark in the analysis of experimental data. Despite its infuence, nonparametric characterizations and tests of QRE are unavailable beyond the case of finite games. We address this gap by completely characterizing the set of QRE in a class of binary-action games with a continuum of types. Our characterization provides sharp predictions in settings such as global games and the compromise game. Further, we leverage our results to develop nonparametric tests of QRE. As an empirical application, we revisit the experimental data from Carrillo and Palfrey (2009) on the compromise game.
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