Move to menu Move to submenu Move to content


Boundedly Rational Information Demand

Date: Friday, Oct 6, 2023, 10:00 ~ 11:30
Speaker: Yuchen Liang (Carnegie Mellon University)
Location: Zoom을 통한 온라인 세미나
Abstract: Acquiring information about available options before making a decision is useful because it allows decision makers to switch to a superior alternative if the default option is deemed inferior. Therefore, information demand should depend on the distribution of the options’ values. In an experiment, I show that information demand increases as the default worsens, while, on average, it remains insensitive to the prior value of the alternative. These patterns reflect bounded rationality in information valuation, which stems from the difficulty of foreseeing future choices and integrating their payoffs.

※ 본 세미나는 VEAEBES(Virtual East Asia Experimental and Behavioral Economics Seminar Series) 주최로 열리는 세미나 입니다.
참여신청은 아래의 링크로 해주시길 바랍니다.
이후 이메일로 zoom 링크가 발송됩니다.
Scroll Top