When Salary is TBD: Job Seekers’ Beliefs about Missing Wage Information in Job Ads
◈ 주 제: When Salary is TBD: Job Seekers’ Beliefs about Missing Wage Information in Job Ads
◈ 발표자: 김종원 (석사과정)
◈ 일 시: 2025년 12월 17일 수요일 12:00~13:00
◈ 장 소: 우석경제관(223동) 504호
◈ 주 관: 경제학부, 경제연구소 한국경제혁신센터, SSK, BK21
Abstract
This project examines why firms omit wages from job advertisements and how such non-disclosure shapes application behavior and labor market outcomes. Using job ads data collected from a major Korean online platform, I estimate the causal effect of wage disclosure on application rates with Double/Debiased Machine Learning, and find heterogeneous effects by skill level: wage disclosure reduces applications among high-skill workers but increases them among low-skill workers. To identify the underlying mechanisms, I discuss two extensions currently in progress. First, I present the design of a survey experiment that will elicit workers' beliefs about undisclosed wages, testing whether job seekers systematically misperceive wages and whether these beliefs vary by worker skill level. Second, I outline a directed search model where firms strategically choose whether to post wages, anticipating that workers hold potentially inaccurate beliefs about missing information.